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Abstract 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County has severely limited the power of 
the Voting Rights Act.  I argue that Congressional attempts to pass a new coverage formula 
are unlikely to gain the necessary Republican support.  Instead, I propose a new strategy 
that takes a “carrot and stick” approach.  As the stick, I suggest amending Section 3 to 
eliminate the need to prove that discrimination was intentional.  For the carrot, I envision 
a competitive grant program similar to the highly successful Race to the Top education 
grants.  I argue that this plan could pass the currently divided Congress. 
  Without Congressional action, Section 2 is more important than ever before. A 
successful Section 2 suit requires evidence that voting in the jurisdiction is racially 
polarized.  Accurately and objectively assessing the level of polarization has been and 
continues to be a challenge for experts.  Existing ecological inference methods require 
estimating polarization levels in individual elections.  This is a problem because the Courts 
want to see a history of polarization across elections. 
I propose a new 2-step method to estimate racially polarized voting in a multi-
election context.  The procedure builds upon the Rosen, Jiang, King, and Tanner (2001) 
multinomial-Dirichlet model.  After obtaining election-specific estimates, I suggest 
regressing those results on election-specific variables, namely candidate quality, 
incumbency, and ethnicity of the minority candidate of choice.  This allows researchers to 
estimate the baseline level of support for candidates of choice and test whether the ethnicity 
of the candidates affected how voters cast their ballots. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Shelby County v. Holder, which 
found the Section 4 coverage formula for preclearance unconstitutional, numerous 
proposals for Congressional action have been suggested.  Two of the main proposals, 
amending Section 3 and revising Section 4, have been combined in a bill currently before 
Congress, the Voting Rights Amendments of 2014.  The bill has stalled in committee and 
has few Republican allies.1  To reignite the momentum to pass the bill, I suggest 
abandoning efforts to revise Section 4.  The coverage formula, any coverage formula, is 
simply too controversial among Republicans who see it as lingering punishment for the 
Civil War.  Instead, I argue that the Section 3 amendment should be coupled with a 
competitive grant program to incentivize states to voluntarily reform their election 
procedures.  Such a program could encourage states to shorten wait times at polling 
places and reduce the burden that voter identification laws place on voters.  
Until Congress acts, the remaining provisions of the Voting Rights Act are more 
important than ever before.  Because Section 3 requires proving that a jurisdiction has 
discriminated intentionally, it will only be useful against a very small number of 
jurisdictions.  Most of the cases brought under the Voting Rights Act, in its present form, 
                                                          
1 Indeed, the bill has even fewer allies after Eric Cantor’s primary loss.  Any hopes that the bill would pass 
quickly were based on his support. 
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will be based on violations of Section 2.  Doing so will require estimates of racially 
polarized voting.  
Unfortunately, such estimates are difficult to obtain and courts have been wary of 
sanctioning statistically advanced methods.  Additionally, no agreement exists over how 
to select which elections to study.  Some consultants analyze every election over the 
period in question.  Others select a subset of elections, but this can raise allegations of 
cherry-picking data.  Cherry-picking is especially tempting in litigation, where the data is 
being analyzed by consultants paid by the plaintiffs or defendants.  These consultants 
clearly have a conflict of interest when picking which elections to include in their reports 
to the courts.  The problem with increasing the number of elections studied is that 
estimates often differ between elections.  If the results from one election display racially 
polarized voting but results from another do not, what conclusion should be reached?  
Currently, no method for aggregating the estimates across elections exists.  This paper 
seeks to provide a first step toward creating such a method.   
 I propose using a 2-step method to estimate racially polarized voting in a multi-
election context.  In the first step, I obtain election-specific estimates of racially polarized 
voting using the Rosen, Jiang, King, and Tanner (2001) multinomial-Dirichlet model.  In 
the second step, I regress these election results on election-level variables, specifically 
candidate quality, incumbency, and ethnicity of the minority candidate of choice.  This 
allows me to estimate the baseline level of support for candidates of choice and test 
whether the ethnicity of the candidates affected how voters cast their ballots. 
In Chapter 2, I discuss the history of the Voting Rights Act and litigation prior to 
Shelby.  I begin by discussing Jim Crow laws and the context of the passage of the Voting 
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Rights Act.  I look at the debate in Congress surrounding each reauthorization and 
notable court cases that followed each reauthorization.  The Supreme Court’s strong 
suggestions in NAMUDNO that the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional are discussed.  
Additionally, I consider the effect of the Voting Rights Act on minority voting and the 
ancillary laws that have subsequently been passed. 
In the third chapter, I discuss the facts behind Shelby and the Court’s holding.  I 
begin by discussing the background of the case and the key questions that, prior to the 
decision, I posited might be pivotal to the Court’s holding.  I include my own predictions 
of how the Justices would rule, where I accurately predicted that Section 4 and only 
Section 4 would be found unconstitutional.  I then analyze the majority and minority 
opinions. 
In the fourth chapter, I discuss developments since Shelby and suggest a new path 
for Congressional action.  I begin by detailing how states, the Department of Justice, and 
Congress have reacted to the decision.  Then, I evaluate proposals to amend Section 3 
and Section 4.  I conclude that the former is politically viable but the latter is a political 
nonstarter.  I propose taking a “carrot and stick” approach.  Amending Section 3 serves as 
a “stick” to punish jurisdictions that discriminate.  I recommend creating a competitive 
grant program to reward districts for improving voting procedures as the “carrot.”  I 
argue that this could pass Congress during the lame duck session. 
In Chapter 5, I discuss why estimates of racially polarized voting are needed from 
a legal standpoint.  First, I explain the constitutional requirement to reapportion 
Congressional districts and the Supreme Court cases that caused the need for equal 
population districts.  Then, I discuss how the Voting Rights Act regulates redistricting 
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and the specific requirements to satisfy Section 2.  I look at the Supreme Court’s three-
prong test for determining when majority-minority districts should be drawn and 
highlight the difficulty of estimating one of those prongs, racially polarized voting. 
In Chapter 6, I discuss the general ecological inference problem and the most 
commonly used methods of estimating racially polarized voting.  I explain why 
estimating rates of crossover voting poses an ecological inference problem.  Then, I 
discuss several commonly used methods to estimate racially polarized voting: 
homogenous precinct analysis, Goodman’s Ecological Regression, double regression, 
King’s Ecological Inference, and the multinomial-Dirichlet model.     
In the seventh chapter, I explain the method that I propose for estimating racially 
polarized voting in a multiple-election context.  This method improves upon existing 
methods that first estimate elections separately and then rely on experts to interpret the 
results across elections.  Instead, I suggest adding an additional step that considers 
election-specific factors that may have influenced how voters cast their ballots. 
In Chapter 8, I apply the method proposed in Chapter 7 to data from Los Angeles 
County.  I look specifically at Supervisorial District 3, where voting has previously been 
shown to be racially polarized.  I examine 10 elections and find that a multi-election 
analysis shows that voting is not racially polarized.  More specifically, I find evidence 
that Hispanics vote as a bloc for Hispanics, but I do not find that non-Hispanics vote as a 
bloc to defeat the Hispanic candidate of choice. 
Finally, I conclude in Chapter 9 and recommend requiring law school students to 
take a quantitative methods class to equip future judges to evaluate statistical evidence.    
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Chapter 2 
 
The Long and Winding Road: A Legislative and 
Judicial History of the Voting Rights Act 
 
 
2.1 Overview  
The Voting Rights Act has had a long and winding legislative and judicial history.  
In this chapter, I present that history and explain how the most important provisions of 
this landmark civil rights legislation have changed over time.  Understanding this 
background is essential in order to grasp the relevance and impact of recent challenges to 
the law.  
 
2.2 Introduction 
 The Voting Rights Act has been reauthorized, amended, and reinterpreted on 
numerous occasions in the nearly 50 years since its passage.  Over time, the relative 
power of its individual provisions has shifted.  Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted 
Section 5 broadly, making it the section most commonly litigated under.  When the 
Supreme Court narrowly interpreted Section 2 in 1980, Congress quickly responded by 
strengthening Section 2 in the 1982 reauthorization.  At the same time, the Court began 
narrowly interpreting Section 5.  As a result, Section 2 became the section most 
commonly litigated under.  After the Court further narrowed Section 5 in 2003, Congress 
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responded by strengthening Section 5 in the 2006 reauthorization.  Although the power of 
the individual provisions of the Voting Rights Act has varied, Congress has repeatedly 
strengthened the VRA. 
 Congress’s repeated efforts to strengthen the VRA, despite judicial challenges, are 
important because they demonstrate Congress’s commitment to strong protections of 
minority voting rights.  Congress could have allowed most of the provisions of the law to 
lapse by failing to reauthorize the law.  Alternatively, Congress could have reauthorized a 
weak voting rights act, by not revising it to overcome narrow judicial interpretations.  
Instead, Congress repeatedly reauthorized and strengthened the Voting Rights Act.  
 This chapter begins, in Section 2.3, with an overview of minority voting rights 
prior to the landmark passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.  Section 2.4 discusses the 
original Voting Rights Act and legal challenges to it.  Section 2.5 covers the first 
reauthorization, in 1970, and subsequent legal challenges.  The 1975 authorization and 
legal challenges to it are discussed in Section 2.6.  In Section 2.7, the 1982 
reauthorization is laid out along with relevant legal challenges. The most recent 
reauthorization and judicial challenges are discussed in Section 2.8.  Section 2.9 
discusses the legacy of the Voting Rights Act and ancillary voting rights laws.  Finally, 
Section 2.10 concludes. 
   
2.3 Minority Voting Before the Voting Rights Act 
Initially after the Civil War, Black voter turnout was extraordinarily high.  In 
many Southern states, including Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, Blacks constituted 
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a majority of the electorate.2  In many elections, Black voter turnout reached rates as high 
as 90 percent.3  Black voting rates remained high even after reconstruction military forces 
left the Southern states.4  For example, two out of three Black men voted in the 1880 
presidential election.5 Additionally, Blacks were extremely successful at winning 
political offices.  From 1878 to 1900, twenty Blacks were elected to Congress, all from 
majority Black districts.6  In the 44th Congress, there were eight Black representatives.7 
After passing the Thirteenth Amendment freeing the slaves, Congress enacted 
additional laws and amendments to protect the rights of Blacks.  Congress passed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 to combat the Black Codes that many southern legislatures had 
enacted, some of which went as far as requiring freed slaves to work for their former 
masters, essentially continuing slavery.8  The act said that all citizens, regardless of color, 
had the right to sue, give evidence, hold property, and enjoy equal benefit of all laws for 
the security of person and property.9  Fearing that a future Congress could repeal these 
rights, its proponents began a push to solidify these rights into a constitutional 
amendment, which ultimately became the Fourteenth Amendment.10  The amendment 
declared “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
                                                          
2 Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, Const. Comment. 17:295, 299-300 
(2000). 
3 Id.  
4 Id. 
5 Id.  
6 Katherine Tate, Black Faces in the Mirror 51 (2003). 
7 Carol M. Swain, Black Faces, Black Interest: The Representation of African Americans in Congress 21. 
(2006). 
8 Eugene Gressman. The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Mich. L. Rev. 50:8 1323, 1325 (1952). 
9 Id. at 1328. 
10 Id. 
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jurisdiction thereof, are citizens.”11  Additionally, all citizens were guaranteed due 
process and equal protection.12 
Less than two years after the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of equal 
protection were ratified in 1868, the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, providing that 
“the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”13  Both amendments granted Congress the right to enforce them “by 
appropriate legislation.”14  Congress exercised this power quickly with the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1870.15  In addition to reenacting the provisions of the 1866 law, the 
new act criminalized interfering with a citizen’s right to vote and made the use of 
intimidation to hinder the enjoyment of any Constitutional right a felony.16  In 1871, 
Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act to establish civil and criminal penalties to combat 
the rise of the Klan, but it was later overturned by the Supreme Court.17 
 In 1875, Congress passed another civil rights act to “protect all citizens in their 
civil and legal rights.”18  The first two sections of the law required all places of public 
amusement to open their accommodations and privileges to citizens of every race and 
gave anyone denied access the right to recover $500 for each offense.19  In 1883, the 
Supreme Court invalidated these provisions, asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment 
                                                          
11 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
12 Eugene Gressman. The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Mich. L. Rev. 50:8 1323, 1328 (1952). 
13 Id. at 1333. 
14 Id. at 1334. 
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 1340. 
18 18 Stat. L. 335. 
19 Eugene Gressman. The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Mich. L. Rev. 50:8 1323, 1335 (1952). 
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only protected Blacks from discrimination by the State, not by private individuals.20  The 
Supreme Court’s decisions overturning the Ku Klux Klan Act and the Civil Rights Act of 
1875 effectively transferred the responsibility for protecting civil rights back to the 
states.21 
Southern states essentially disregarded the guarantees of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments.22 They controlled Congress and were able to block efforts to 
enforce the amendments.23  Southern Democrats enacted Jim Crow laws to limit the 
ability of Blacks to vote. 24  They also gerrymandered districts, switched to at-large 
elections, required literacy tests, enacted poll taxes, and added bond requirements for 
officeholders.25  Additionally, they set up property qualifications, grandfather clauses, 
and good character clauses.26  At the same time, they also passed secret-ballot laws, 
which disadvantaged illiterate ex-slaves, and created the white primary system.27  
Whenever a voter suppression method ceased to be successful, a new technique was 
quickly thought up.28   
From 1900 to 1964, Jim Crow laws were extremely successful at disenfranchising 
Black citizens.  In Louisiana, the number of Blacks registered to vote dropped from 
                                                          
20 Id. at 1340. 
21 Id. at 1342. 
22 Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the 
Political Process 459 (3rd 2007). 
23 Id. 
24 J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-2007, Tex. L. 
Rev. 86(4): 670, 679 (2008). 
25 Id. 
26 C. Van Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 84 (2002). 
27 J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-2007, Tex. L. 
Rev. 86(4): 670, 679 (2008). 
28 Id. 
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130,334 in 1896 to 1,342 in 1904.29  In 1896, twenty-six Louisiana parishes had majority 
Black constituencies.30  By 1900, Blacks were in the minority in every parish.31  In the 
first six decades of the twentieth century, Black voters were almost completely shut out 
of politics in the South.32  To spur Congressional action, the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC), and the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 
began registration drives.33  
Congress responded by enacting two relatively weak voting rights bills in 1957 
and 1960. Most notably, these bills created a Civil Rights Division at the Department of 
Justice and authorized that department to bring suits on behalf of citizens who were 
denied the right to vote on account of race.34  The burden of initiating litigation was on 
the Justice Department or on voting rights proponents.35  Such case-by-case litigation was 
slow and expensive.36  Local election officials often resisted cooperating with Justice 
Department investigators by “losing” records or even resigning to quash injunctions.37 
Investigations took hundreds and sometimes thousands of hours.38  Victories were often 
pyrrhic.39  Even worse, after losing a voting rights case, localities would often simply 
                                                          
29 C. Van Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 84 (2002). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Spencer Overton, Stealing Democracy: The New Politics of Voter Suppression 92 (2006).  
33 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Richard L. Hasen, Daniel P. Tokaji, Election Law Cases and Materials 37 (2008). 
34 Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the 
Political Process 459 (3rd 2007). 
35 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Richard L. Hasen, Daniel P. Tokaji, Election Law Cases and Materials 37 (2008). 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
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replace the old, banned practice with a new practice that would reach the same result of 
excluding Blacks from the ballot box.40  
Southerners often circumvented federal legislation by replacing banned practices 
with similar methods.  For example, the poll tax was considered “the most effective 
instrumentality” of disenfranchisement.41  By 1908, each of the eleven former 
Confederate states had enacted a poll tax.42  In an attempt to ban the practice and expand 
the franchise, Congress passed the 24th Amendment in 1962 to prohibit poll taxes in 
federal elections.43  Before the amendment was even ratified by the states, the Virginia 
legislature quickly enacted a law to ensure poll taxes would be used in state elections.44 
 Despite these Congressional attempts to stop Jim Crow laws, little progress was 
achieved.  Between 1957 and 1964, the Justice Department filed 71 voting rights cases, 
but registration rates remained extremely low.45  In 1954, 4.4 percent of Blacks were 
registered in Mississippi; in 1964, 6.4 percent of Mississippi Blacks were registered.46  In 
Alabama, registration rates rose from 5.2 percent in 1958 to 19.4 percent in 1964.47  The 
SCLC and SNCC continued their registration efforts and moved their organizations into 
Selma, Alabama.48 
                                                          
40 Spencer Overton, Stealing Democracy: The New Politics of Voter Suppression 92 (2006). 
41 J. Morgan Kousser, Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the Second 
Reconstruction 53 (1999). 
42 Id. 
43 24th Amendment, Banning Poll Tax, Has Been Ratified The New York Times. January 24, 1964.  
44 24th Amendment, Banning Poll Tax, Has Been Ratified The New York Times. January 24, 1964. 
45 Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the 
Political Process 459 (3rd 2007). 
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
48 Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the 
Political Process 460 (3rd 2007). 
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 Their efforts came to a head on March 7, 1965, a day that would be remembered 
as “Bloody Sunday.”49  John Lewis and a group of 600 people planned to march from 
Selma, Alabama to the state capital of Montgomery.50  When they attempted to cross the 
Edmund Pettus Bridge, only six blocks from where they had started their march, they 
were met by dozens of Alabama state troopers and dozens more armed men.51  As the 
marchers reached the bottom of the bridge, the troopers charged the marchers, shooting 
tear gas, trampling the marchers with horses, and beating them with nightsticks and 
whips.52 The marchers attempted to retreat, scrabbling back across the bridge, but the 
troopers went after them, attacking everyone in the streets.53 That night, Americans 
sitting in their living rooms to watch the Sunday night movie were shocked when their 
program was interrupted by gruesome images of peaceful protestors bleeding and crying 
out in agony as white troopers beat them.54 
 The nation was outraged. Protests denouncing the violence occurred in more than 
eighty cities.55 President Lyndon Johnson went on national television to call for the 
passage of a new, stronger voting rights law. He said, “There is no Negro problem. There 
is no Southern problem.  There is no Northern problem.  There is only an American 
problem.”56  Then, employing a well-known civil rights slogan to demand a strong bill 
from Congress, President Johnson said “We shall overcome.”57 
                                                          
49 Id.  
50 Spencer Overton, Stealing Democracy: The New Politics of Voter Suppression, 93 (2006). 
51 Id.  
52 Id. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 94. 
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Richard L. Hasen, Daniel P. Tokaji, Election Law Cases and Materials, 37 (2008). 
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2.4 Passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Supreme 
Court’s Response 
 
2.4.1 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 
Responding to the violence in Selma, Congress quickly began considering a 
voting rights bill to strengthen the 14th and 15th Amendment’s protections of the right to 
vote for minorities.58  Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen began working with 
Attorney General Katzenbach to draft the legislation.59  Ten days after Bloody Sunday, a 
bill was introduced in Congress and cosponsored by Senate Majority Leader Mike 
Mansfield and Senate Minority leader Everett Dirksen.60  In a strong bipartisan 
demonstration of support, the bill ultimately had 66 cosponsors in the Senate.61   
Despite the overwhelming number of Senators supporting the bill, the opposition 
was fierce.62  To prevent the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Mississippi 
Senator James Eastland, from killing the bill in committee, the Senate had to pass a 
motion to require the committee to report the bill out of committee by April 9.63  As the 
bill was being debated by the full Senate, Senator Strom Thurmond declared that passage 
of the bill would cause “despotism and tyranny.”64  Southern Senators offered several 
                                                          
58 J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-2007, Tex. L. 
Rev. 86(4): 670, 681 (2008). 
59 Gary May, Bending Toward Justice: The Voting Rights Act and the Transformation of American 
Democracy 96 (2013).  
60 Id. at 150. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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amendments in an attempt to weaken the bill, but none of the amendment passed.65  On 
May 29, the Senate passed the Voting Rights Act by a vote of 77-19.66 
In the House, opponents of the bill slowed its progress through committees.  Full 
House debate did not start until the beginning of July.67  In an attempt to kill the strong 
Voting Rights Act that had passed the Senate, House Republicans offered an alternative, 
weaker bill that would have empowered the Attorney General to appoint federal registrars 
and imposed a nationwide ban on literacy tests.68  That bill died by a vote of 171-248 on 
July 9 and the Voting Rights Act was passed that same night by a vote of 333-85.69  The 
House approved the conference committee version of the bill on August 3 and the Senate 
passed the bill the following day.70  On August 6, President Johnson signed the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.71   
The law gave the federal government broad new powers to end the discriminatory 
voting practices that were used to disenfranchise minority voters.  Section 2 banned any 
practice in any jurisdiction that denied or abridged of the right to vote.72  Unlike Sections 
4-9, Section 2 was permanent.73  Because Section 2 essentially just restated the 15th 
Amendment, most of the new federal powers to limit discrimination came from Sections 
4 and 5.74 
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Sections 4-9 were only applicable to the states included in Section 4’s coverage 
formula.75  That formula included states and localities that used a literacy or other test as 
a condition for registering or voting in 1964 and in which less than half of the voting age 
population voted in the 1964 presidential election.76  This resulted in Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and large parts of North Carolina being 
covered.77  Initially, Sections 4-9 were scheduled to expire in 1970.78 
Section 5 required states and localities to obtain “preclearance” of “any voting 
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure with respect to 
voting” from either the attorney general or the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia.79  If preclearance were denied by the attorney general, it could still be sought 
from the judiciary.80  The preclearance requirement was needed because, as the House 
Judiciary Committee declared, “[b]arring one contrivance too often has caused no change 
in result, only in methods.”81  Sections 6 through 9 allowed the Attorney General to 
request federal registrars and election observer to assure nondiscriminatory election 
administration in jurisdictions covered by Section 4.82  In these covered jurisdictions, the 
VRA prohibited the use of literacy tests and other tests or devices.83   
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2.4.2 The Supreme Courts Upholds the VRA 
Immediately after the passage of the Voting Rights Act, opponents challenged its 
constitutionality and scope.  In South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966), the Court upheld 
the coverage formula, the ban on literacy tests, and the preclearance requirements as 
constitutional based on Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.84  The 
Court acknowledged that the bill had a wide reach into state prerogatives, but said those 
provisions of the law were justified by the South’s long history of blatantly violating the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.85  The Court also said that, although literacy tests 
are not unconstitutional, Congress was within its power to ban them in the South in order 
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.86   
In Allen v. State Board of Elections (1969), the Supreme Court rejected a narrow 
reading of Section 5 that would have limited its application to voter registration.87  The 
ruling combined four cases, all of which considered whether newly enacted state laws or 
regulations were covered by Section 5.88  In “reject[ing] a narrow construction,” the 
Court held that the VRA was “aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state 
regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their 
race.”89  With these sweeping decisions by the Court, Section 5 became a strong and 
wide-reaching provision. 
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2.5 Reauthorizing and Updating the VRA in 1970 
 
2.5.1 Updating the VRA in 1970 
In 1970, Congress renewed Section 5 for an additional 5 years over the opposition 
of the Nixon administration, which advocated for a repeal of Section 5.90,91  Attorney 
General John Mitchell argued that Section 5 should be allowed to expire because the 
Justice Department had never really enforced it.92  Indeed, from 1965 to 1970, the Justice 
Department usually assigned only one lawyer to monitoring state and local compliance 
with Section 5.93  Jurisdictions rarely submitted electoral changes for preclearance, but no 
criminal or civil sanctions were imposed on them.94  Even if a jurisdiction did obey the 
preclearance requirement, the Justice Department did not have the manpower to ensure 
that laws it objected to were not subsequently enacted.95  The administration’s opposition 
to a straightforward renewal awakened the laws supporters and a backlash ensued.96  In 
the Senate, liberals rallied to renew the VRA, including Section 5, for another five years 
by a vote of 64 to 12.97  Despite the Nixon administration’s opposition, the House voted 
to reauthorize Section 5 by a bipartisan vote of 272 to 132.98  Nixon capitulated and 
signed the reauthorization.99 
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While the amendments of 1970 were largely the same as the original 1965 
legislation, some important changes were included.  A key modification was that the bill 
expanded the VRA’s reach to include language minorities.100  Now, Hispanics, Native 
Americans, Asians, and Native Alaskans were protected by the VRA.101  Additionally, 
two new sections, Section 4(f) and Section 203, were added.102  Section 4(f) targeted a 
limited number of jurisdictions to prohibit English-only election materials in jurisdictions 
that had a history of discriminating against language minority groups that compose over 
5% of the jurisdiction.103  Section 203, like Section 5, was not permanent, but it did apply 
nationwide and required language-assistance in areas with sizeable minority groups and 
high rates of illiteracy.104    
A few other notable changes were include in the revised bill.  Congress updated 
Section 4’s coverage formula, using November 1968 as the new date from which to 
examine minority election registration and participation.105 Congress also expanded the 
ban on literacy tests to include the entire nation for a five-year period.106  Additionally, 
Congress heightened the bailout requirements.107   
2.5.2 Broad Interpretations of Section 5  
 Opponents of the Voting Rights Act continued to seek to narrow the scope of the 
Section 5 requirements.  In Perkins v. Matthews, the Court was asked to decide what 
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types of election changes are covered under Section 5.108  In another broad reading of 
Section 5, the Court held that changes in locations of polling places, changes in municipal 
boundaries through annexations, and a change to at-large election of aldermen were all 
covered by the preclearance requirement.109  Thus, the Court again took an expansive 
reading of the federal government’s powers under the Voting Rights Act. 
 
2.6 Expanding the VRA in 1975, but Limiting it in 1976 
 
2.6.1 The 1975 Reauthorization 
In 1975, Congress again renewed and expanded the Voting Rights Act.110  Riding 
the wave of Watergate, Democrats had swept the 1974 midterm elections.111  Attempts to 
end Section 5 or expand coverage to the entire nation (thereby overwhelming the Justice 
Department and diluting the department’s ability to enforce the law) failed in the 
Senate.112  The proposal that came closest to passing, losing 48-41 in the Senate, was 
sponsored by Georgia Democrat Sam Nunn and was supported by 24 Democrats and 17 
Republicans.113  To ensure that Section 5 would apply to redistricting after the 1980 
census, the House passed a reauthorization that would last for ten years.  As the Senate 
was considering the House bill, President Gerald Ford flip-flopped, initially supporting 
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the bill, then opposing it, then ultimately backing it.114  The Senate passed the bill 77-12, 
but reduced the reauthorization period from 10 years to 7 years.115  Without convening a 
conference committee, the House passed the Senate’s amendments by a 345-56 vote.116 
In addition to renewing the act for a period of 7 years, several other provisions 
were revised or added.117  The coverage formula was updated to make 1972 the new date 
from which to examine minority election registration and participation.118  Congress also 
expanded the definition of tests and devices to include the provision of English-only 
election information in jurisdictions with a single language minority group that 
comprised more than five percent of the voting age citizens.119  This extended coverage 
to three new states: Alaska, Arizona, and Texas.120  Furthermore, the nationwide ban on 
literacy tests was made permanent.121   
 
2.6.2 SCOTUS Begins Limiting the VRA 
In 1976, the Court began limiting the power of Section 5.  In Beer v. United 
States, the Supreme Court interpreted the effect prong of Section 5.122  The Court decided 
that preclearance could not be denied unless minorities were made worse off by the 
change (i.e., there was retrogression).123  Thus, a city that was currently cracking or 
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packing minorities in order to minimize the number of majority-minority districts could 
continue doing so as long as the total number of majority-minority districts did not 
decrease. 
In 1980, the Court also drastically limited the scope of Section 2.  In City of 
Mobile v. Bolden, the Court held that a jurisdiction was not in violation of Section 2 
unless there was evidence of intentional discrimination.124  Civil rights activists regarded 
the decision as a major setback.125  The “devastating” effect of the ruling became 
apparent as dilution cases came to a “virtual standstill.”126  Existing cases were 
overturned or dismissed and new cases were “abandoned.”127  Critics of the ruling looked 
to Congress to “overturn” the ruling.128 
 
2.7 The 1982 VRA Reauthorization 
 
2.7.1 Strengthening the VRA Congressionally 
Despite facing far more opposition in Congress than previous reauthorizations, 
the 1982 reauthorization again strengthened the VRA.  By 1982, many southerners and 
conservatives felt that the Section 5 had achieved its purpose and was no longer 
needed.129  President Ronald Reagan had opposed both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
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the Voting Rights Act of 1965.130  In the Republican-controlled Senate, Strom Thurmond, 
a South Carolina Republican, was chairman of the Judiciary Committee.131  Recognizing 
that reauthorization of Section 5 was in jeopardy, supporters of the act mobilized early 
and prepared for a contentious fight.132   
Because of the recent Bolden decision, the battle in Congress ultimately focused 
on Section 2 rather than Section 5.  The Congressional hearings over the reauthorization 
were used effectively by civil rights activists as a stage to parade the failings of Bolden 
before Congress.133  Numerous witnesses testified to the near impossibility of winning 
vote dilution claims in a post-Bolden world.134  Likewise, a report by the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights concluded that jurisdictions continued to suppress minority 
participation in elections.135  Demonstrating just how successful lobbying efforts by VRA 
proponents were, the House Judiciary Committee voted 23-1 for a bill that not only added 
a results test to Section 2, but also reauthorized Section 5 permanently.136 
As the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution considered the bill, 
Senator Orrin Hatch, the committee’s Chairman, tried to block the proposed intent 
standard for Section 2.137  To prevent the committee from deadlocking, Senator Robert 
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Dole proposed a compromise.138  Section 2 would prohibit any voting procedure that 
“results in a denial or abridgement,” but would also include a guarantee that the test did 
not create a right to proportional representation.139  Instead, having “less opportunity than 
other members of the electorate…to elect representatives of their choice” would be one 
circumstance of the totality of circumstances that could prove a violation of Section 
2.140,141  Liberal Democrats and moderate Republicans united to pass the bill and the 
“Dole Compromise” by veto-proof majorities. 142,143  Despite his previous “vehement 
opposition” to the act, President Reagan signed the law, saying its passage “proves our 
unbending commitment to voting rights.”144 
In addition to the major revision of Section 2, a few other changes were included 
in the final bill.  In order to prevent a majority of covered jurisdictions from becoming 
eligible for bailout, Congress revised the bailout provisions.  To be eligible for a bailout, 
Congress now required jurisdictions to have had no discriminatory voting practices in the 
previous ten years and have taken constructive steps to increase minority voter 
participation.145,146  Additionally, Congress added Section 208, which states that “any 
voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or the inability to 
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read or write may be given assistance by a person of the voter’s choice.”147  Section 208 
was initially intended to help the disabled and illiterate, but it has been used to guarantee 
assistance for limited-English-proficient voters.148  One section that Congress did not 
update was the coverage formula.149 
 
2.7.2 Interpreting the revised Section 2 and Limiting Section 5 
In Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), the Court interpreted the newly-amended Section 
2 language.  The Court held that Section 2 required jurisdictions to create majority-
minority districts when certain criteria were met.  These criteria were spelled out by the 
Court in a 3-prong test known as the Gingles Test.  To prove a Section 2 claim, a 
minority group must meet all 3-prongs of the test.  The first prong requires that the 
minority group be large and compact.  The second prong is that the minority group must 
be politically cohesive.  This means that members of the minority group unite behind a 
minority candidate of choice.  The final Gingles prong requires that the minority group 
must be politically cohesive and they must usually defeat the minority candidate of 
choice.  Additionally, as explicitly required in the amended Section 2 language, courts 
must consider the “totality of circumstances.”  If, in the totality of circumstances, 
minorities have equal opportunities to elect, then they do not have a Section 2 claim.  A 
variety of factors that could provide evidence of a lack of opportunity were suggested in a 
report by the Senate Judiciary Committee, including the extent to which minorities have 
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been elected within the jurisdiction, the use of racial appeals in political campaigns, and 
the exclusion of minorities from the candidate slating process.150   
The Supreme Court continued to limit the power of Section 5. In Presley v. 
Etowah County Commission (1992), the Court narrowed the preclearance requirement.  
The preclearance requirement now only applied to four categories: changes in the “matter 
of voting”; changes to the “candidacy requirements and qualifications”; changes “in the 
composition of the electorate that may vote for candidates”; and “the creation or abolition 
of an elected office.”151  In Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (2000), the Court found 
that a jurisdiction that has a discriminatory purpose is not in violation of Section 5 as long 
as there is no retrogression.152  In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court approved a 
plan that reduced the number of majority-minority districts but expanded the number of 
influence districts.153 The Court held that the “nonretrogression” standard ought not to be 
applied mechanically and that instead a variety of relevant factors ought to be 
considered.154  
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2.8 The Most Recent VRA Reauthorization & a Warning by 
SCOTUS  
 
2.8.1 The 2006 VRA Reauthorization 
Although the 2006 reauthorization faced continued opposition from conservatives 
and southerners, the law was again strengthened.155  In 2006, key Republicans, such as 
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, Republican National Committee Chairman Ken 
Mehlman, and House Judiciary Committee Chairman James Sensenbrenner, all supported 
reauthorization.156   However, the end of Rep. Sensenbrenner’s chairmanship, in January 
2007, was quickly approaching, and his likely successor, Representative Lamar Smith, 
was a Texan who opposed Section 5.157   
Chairman Sensenbrenner and Rep. Mel Watt, the Chairman of the Congressional 
Black Caucus, negotiated two key changes to the VRA.  First, they agreed on a reversal 
of Bossier II that removed “purpose and effect” and added “purpose or effect” to Section 
5.158  Second, to in response to Georgia v. Ashcroft, the bill states that Section 5 “is to 
protect the ability of such citizens to elect their preferred candidates of choice.”159,160  
The amended language would make it much more difficult for majority-minority districts 
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to be reduced to influence districts.161 Additionally, they agreed that the reauthorization 
would last for twenty-five years.162  
Despite the support of the Congressional leadership, several rank-and-file 
Republicans and some liberals opposed the reauthorization.163  A “vociferous” group of 
Republicans, led by southerners, opposed the coverage formula’s targeting of the 
South.164 The group held up the bill for a month, protesting the use of a decades-old 
coverage formula.165  Additionally, many liberal academics worried that the failure to 
update the coverage formula might jeopardize the constitutionality of the act.166 
Although the coverage formula was protested by some on the left and the right, 
the formula was not updated, instead retaining the use of data from 1972.167  The House 
overwhelmingly passed the bill by a vote of 390-33 on July 13, 2006.168  The Senate 
passed the bill by a vote of 98-0 only seven days later, on July 20, and President George 
W. Bush then signed the bill on July 27.169   
 
2.8.2 SCOTUS Warns that the Reauthorization may be Unconstitutional in 
NAMUDNO 
 After Congress renewed the Voting Rights Act for an additional twenty five 
years, the Supreme Court hinted that the reauthorization of the preclearance requirement 
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may have been unconstitutional.  In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. 
Holder (2009) (NAMUDNO), a small utility district challenged the constitutionality of 
Section 5.170  In a unanimous decision, the Court decided to interpret the bailout 
provision broadly, thereby rendering the utility district eligible for a bailout.171  All of the 
Justices except Justice Thomas, agreed to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of Section 
5.172  Even though discussion of Section 5 was unnecessary for the holding, the majority 
hinted that they might not find it constitutional in a future case.173  Chief Justice Roberts, 
writing for the majority, said that the Voting Rights Act “now raises serious 
constitutional concerns.”174  Justice Thomas wrote a notable dissent in which he 
concluded that Section 5 was unconstitutional.175   
 
2.9 The Legacy of the Voting Rights Act 
 
2.9.1 The Effect of the VRA on Minority Representation 
The Voting Rights Act has increased both voter registration rates and descriptive 
minority representation.  The gap between Black and white registration rates decreased 
from 44 percent to 11 percent from 1965 to 1972 in the seven states originally covered.176  
Descriptive representation soared after the 1990s redistricting cycle was conducted under 
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a Section 2 that had been strengthened by the 1982 Amendments.177  The number of 
Black Congressmen from the eleven former Confederate states rose from 5 in 1990 to 17 
in 1993.178 
While the increase in descriptive representation in undeniable, scholars disagree 
over whether race matters for substantive representation.  Two leading proponents of the 
idea that race does not matter are Abigail Therston and Carol Swain.  In Whose Votes 
Count?, Abigail Thernston argued that the Voting Rights Act was never intended to 
provide descriptive representation and, instead, provides substantive representation by 
empowering Blacks to influence which white candidate wins election.179  In Black Faces, 
Black Interests, Carol Swain found that whites could effectively represent Black 
interest.180  Her regression analysis of House members’ votes in the 100th Congress 
showed that votes were unaffected by the percentage of Blacks in a Congressional district 
and the representative’s race.181  Despite this finding that descriptive representation did 
not increase substantive representation, she saw other merits to descriptive 
representation.182  Having Blacks in Congress, she said, was valuable to provide role 
models and decrease racial polarization.183 She found that redistricting had reached the 
maximum number of majority Black districts and, therefore, to further increase Black 
representation efforts needed to be made to win in majority-white districts.184  
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Many authors have disagreed with Therston and Swain and found that majority-
minority districts are necessary for substantive representation.  In The Paradox of 
Representation, David Lublin analyzed House votes from 1872 to 1992 and found that 
substantive representation of Blacks occurs, but only when Blacks constitute over 40 
percent of a district.185  Because districts where Blacks constitute less than 50 percent of 
the voting population are unlikely to elect Black candidates, Lublin says maximizing 
descriptive representation can decrease substantive representation.186  Lublin 
recommends that district lines be drawn to balance between drawing districts with over 
50 percent minority population (to achieve descriptive representation) and districts with 
40 to 50% minority population (to maximize substantive representation).187  Studying the 
1982, 1984, and 1986 elections, Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley concluded that 
majority-minority districts are necessary for descriptive representation.188  In another 
study of the 1970s and 1980s, they found that majority-white districts virtually always 
elect white candidates.189   
In The Color of Representation, Kenny J. Whitby finds that substantive 
representation is “periodic” and varies by issue.190  He found that legislators were more 
responsive to Black constituents’ interests in fair housing legislation than on voting rights 
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bills.191  Whitby also found that the race of a legislator affected votes on civil rights bills, 
but that this effect was “periodic” and depended on the content of the legislation.192  
In Race, Redistricting, and Representation, a more comprehensive study of bill 
sponsorship, floor speeches, and committee assignments in the 103rd Congress, David T. 
Canon found that majority-Black districts elected legislators who better represented 
Black interest.193 Canon also found that representatives who had ran campaigns seeking 
biracial support were less supportive of Black issues in Congress.194  Canon’s results 
were corroborated by Kerry L. Haynie’s analysis of state legislatures in African American 
Legislators in the American States.195   
In Black Faces in the Mirror, Katherine Tate found support for the theory that 
descriptive representation matters.  She analyzed data from the 104th Congress and survey 
data from the 1996 National Black Election Study.196  Like previous studies, she found 
that Black members of Congress were more likely to stand up for Black interests.197  
Interestingly, she also found that Black constituents were more likely to be satisfied with 
their representative when their Congressman was Black.198 
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2.9.2 Ancillary Federal and State Legislation 
The success of the Voting Rights Act in increasing registration rates and the 
number of majority-minority districts has led Congress to pass several ancillary laws. 
In 1986, Congress passed and President Reagan signed the Uniformed and 
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) to protect the rights of service 
members to vote.199  The law permits service members and overseas voters to use 
absentee registration procedures and to vote by absentee ballot in Federal elections.200  
Additionally, the law requires state election officials to accept voter registration 
applications from overseas voters that are received at least 30 days prior to the 
election.201  Furthermore, the act permits overseas voters to use write-in absentee ballots 
in general elections for federal office.202 
In 1993, President Clinton signed the National Voter Registration Act, commonly 
known as the “motor voter” act, to expand opportunities to register to vote.203  The law 
required that all states that do not offer election-day voter registration must establish 
mail-in voter registration programs, stop the practice of purging nonvoters from the rolls, 
and must provide applicants for a driver’s license with a voter registration form.204  
Although the first and second provisions have been thought to have little effect on voter 
registration rates, the DMV provision has significantly increased participation rates.205 
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Following the controversial 2000 Presidential election, Congress passed and 
President Bush signed the Help America Vote Act.206  The law allocated $325 million to 
replace punch card and lever voting machines before the 2004 election.207  The bill also 
established the Election Assistance Commission to oversee testing and certification or 
voting systems.208 Additionally, the law spelled out minimum requirements for voting 
systems, for provisional voting, and for computerized statewide voter registration lists.209  
Another $325 million was designated for the acquisition of voting systems and 
administrative compliance with the law.210 
To expand the protections of the VRA, legislators in Sacramento passed a state-
based remedy: the California Voting Rights Act.211  The law largely mirrors Section 2’s 
protections of majority-minority districts, but deviates by also protecting influence 
districts.212  Empowered by the law, minorities have pushed cities, counties, and school 
districts to switch from at-large to district elections.213 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
 The individual sections of the Voting Rights Act have repeatedly been altered by 
Congress and the Court.  After initially being interpreted broadly by the Court, Section 5 
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was later weakened by the Court.  After the Court narrowly interpreted Section 2, 
Congress greatly strengthened it.  Despite the numerous times that the Voting Rights Act 
has been reauthorized, amended, and reinterpreted, Congress has strengthened it with 
each reauthorization.   
 Despite this complicated history, one takeaway is clear: the Voting Rights Act 
dramatically increased minority voter registration.  In the seven states originally covered, 
the gap between Black and white registration rates decreased from 44 percent to 11 
percent from 1965 to 1972.214  Because minority voter registration rates are so much 
higher now than they were when the last was originally passed, does it make sense to 
have an even stronger VRA today?  This is the tough question that the Court grappled 
with in Shelby County v. Holder.215 
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Chapter 3 
 
Shelby v. Holder: A Predictable Partisan Divide 
 
 
3.1 Overview  
In this chapter, I review the recent Supreme Court case Shelby v. Holder.  I present the 
background of the case and predictions that I made after oral arguments, before the Court 
issued its ruling.  I analyze the opinions and evaluate my predictions.  I find that Section 
2 is likely safe from a challenge in the near future, but any future revisions to the 
coverage formula would need to limit the scope of coverage. 
 
3.2 Introduction 
 After the Court made it clear in NAMUDNO that the Voting Rights Act was 
vulnerable to a challenge, it was only a matter of time before another VRA case made it 
to the Court.  Less than four years after issuing its warning in NAMUDNO, the Court 
granted certiorari to Shelby v. Holder, yet another challenge to Sections 4 and 5.  
Supporters of the Voting Rights Act worried that entire law up might be overturned.  
After the Court heard oral arguments, but before the Court issued its ruling I analyzed the 
Court’s options and concluded that the Court was likely to find Section 4(b), the coverage 
formula, unconstitutional.  I predicted that the ruling would be a 5-4 split with Justice 
Kennedy joining the Court’s conservative block.  Additionally, I asserted that the Court 
would most likely remain silent on the constitutionality of the rest of the Voting Rights 
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Act.  Each of those predictions proved correct.  Thankfully for supporters of the Voting 
Rights Act, I was wrong about the standard of review that the Court would apply.  Rather 
than raising the standard of review to congruent and proportional and throwing Section 2 
in jeopardy, the Court decided the case using a rational basis standard.  This is especially 
important since Section 2 will be relied upon even more for combating voting 
discrimination now that jurisdictions are free from preclearance.  
 In Section 3.3, I briefly lay out the facts and history of Shelby.  Section 3.4 begins 
my analysis of the case prior to the Court’s holding, laying out key questions that I 
suggested might determine how the Court would rule.  In Section 3.5, I present my 
evaluation of the possible outcomes from before the holding.  There, I evaluated the 
likelihood of each outcome occurring.  Section 3.6 presents the actual holding of the 
Court and discusses the accuracy of my predictions.  Finally, I conclude in Section 3.7. 
 
3.3 Shelby v. Holder – Facts of the Case and History 
Four year after NAMUDNO, the Court decided to hear another challenge to the 
Voting Rights Act. Shelby County, Alabama had filed suit in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia, seeking both a declaratory judgment that Sections 4(b) and 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act are facially unconstitutional and a permanent injunction 
prohibiting the Attorney General from enforcing them.216  Shelby had not asked to be 
bailed out because the county did not have the needed 10-year history free from VRA 
violations.  Their violations occurred when Shelby held several special elections under a 
law for which it failed to seek preclearance.  Additionally, the Attorney General had 
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recently objected to annexations and a redistricting plan proposed by a city within Shelby 
County.217 
Both the district court and the appeals court found that Section 5 was still 
constitutional.  The district court concluded that “Section 5 remains a ‘congruent and 
proportional remedy to the 21st century problem of voting discrimination in covered 
jurisdictions.”218  The majority on the appeals court found that the burdens of Section 5 
are justified because it is needed to combat discriminatory election laws and procedures.  
Additionally, the appeals court found that the coverage formula was sufficiently tailored 
to the problem that it targets.219  Senior Circuit Judge Williams dissented, finding Section 
4(b) unconstitutional without reaching the constitutionality of Section 5.220  
 
3.4 Shelby v. Holder – Key Questions 
Before the Court announced its holding in Shelby, I identified the following key 
questions that the Court needed to consider to address the constitutionality of the Voting 
Rights Act.   
 
3.4.1 What level of scrutiny should the Court apply? 
First, the court must determine what level of scrutiny to apply.  The Court could 
choose to apply a “rational basis” standard, under which the VRA must only be rationally 
linked to a legitimate government interest.  This is what the Court used in Katzenbach, 
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saying that “Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional 
prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”221  The Attorney General has argued that 
this is the applicable standard.222  Alternatively, the Court can apply a higher standard 
requiring the law to be “congruent and proportional” to the harm Congress is seeking to 
remedy.  In City of Borne v. Flores, the Court said “[t]here must be a congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to 
that end.”223  This higher standard is what Shelby argues is appropriate.224    
Based on recent cases and the interpretation of those cases by the lower courts, 
the Supreme Court appears likely to apply the “congruence and proportionality standard” 
from City of Borne.225   Both the district court and the appeals court upheld the Voting 
Rights Act using this higher standard.226  The appeals court said that “[a]lthough 
Congress declined to resolve this issue in Northwest Austin, the questions the Court 
raised—whether section 5’s burdens are justified by current needs and whether its 
disparate geographic reach is sufficiently related to that problem—seem to us the very 
questions one would ask to determine whether section 5 is ‘congruen[t] and 
proportional[] [to] the injury to be prevented.”227  The appeals court “read Northwest 
Austin as sending a powerful signal that congruence and proportionality is the appropriate 
standard of review.”228  Since the composition of the court has not changed since 
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Northwest Austin and that aspect of the decision was unanimous, it seems likely that the 
Supreme Court will apply the higher standard.229  
 
3.4.2 For Section 4, is racial discrimination more prevalent in covered jurisdictions? 
Answering this question is complicated by the abundance of data Congress 
collected, which can point to different conclusions based on the method of analysis used.   
Anticipating a legal battle, Congress documented an extensive history of discrimination 
when it reauthorized the law in 2006.  Over 15,000 pages were submitted to the record 
and 22 hearings were held.230  The two sides, though, disagree over the proper ways to 
evaluate the evidence.  For example, both sides extensively cite evidence of Section 2 
cases, but they reach very different conclusions.  The legislative record cites a study of 
Section 2 cases that concluded that covered jurisdictions, which account for less than 25 
percent of the nation’s population, account for 56 percent of all successful Section 2 
litigation since 1982.231  Shelby counters that instead of aggregating states into two 
categories, the data should be analyzed state-by-state.232  When the Section 2 data 
mentioned above is broken down by state, the data show that many non-covered states 
have more lawsuits than many covered states.  Specifically, “taking the States with the 
highest number of Section 2 lawsuits filed since 1982, the nine fully-covered States are 
only 5 of the top 10.”233  Additionally, “Illinois and Tennessee had more Section 2 
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lawsuits that resulted in findings of intentional discrimination than all but one covered 
State.”234  The Court will have to decide which method of analysis to give credence to.   
Additionally, the sides disagree over whether the Court should consider 
unpublished Section 2 cases.  Looking only at published Section 2 cases, Georgia appears 
to have few violations—between 1982-2004, only three Section 2 cases were successful.  
But when unpublished cases are also considered, that number jumps to 66.235  Shelby 
argued that the methods of collecting this evidence was flawed and argued that this data 
should not be considered.236  The appeals court agreed that “there are reasons to approach 
this data with caution,” but thought the evidence was “helpful.”237  The Court will have to 
decide how much weight to place on such questionable data.   
The Court could bypass considering the data above by finding that Section 4 is 
not rational in theory. 238  Shelby argued that Section 4 is unconstitutional because the 
formula is based on “first generation” tactics (e.g., suppressing minority registration and 
turnout), while the evidence Congress used to justify the reauthorization is of “second 
generation” barriers (e.g., vote dilution).239 In justifying the reauthorization, Congress 
acknowledged that racial disparities in both registration and turnout have “narrowed 
considerably” in covered jurisdictions.240  Because of this “serious mismatch,” Shelby 
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says that “[t]he formula is not rational in theory,” as required by the Court in 
Katzenbach.241   
 
3.4.2 Is discrimination so widespread in covered jurisdictions that case-by-case 
Section 2 litigation is insufficient to combat it? 
If the Court chooses to weigh in on the constitutionality of Section 5, the Justices 
must decide how widespread discrimination must be in order for Section 5 to be 
constitutional.  Shelby has argued that there must be “a widespread pattern of electoral 
gamesmanship showing systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment.”242 The 
appeals court found those to be unreasonably high bars, since “section 5 preclearance 
makes such tactics virtually impossible.”243  Instead, the appeals court found that “what is 
needed to make section 5 congruent and proportional is a pattern of racial discrimination 
in voting so serious and widespread that case-by-case litigation is inadequate.”244 Recall 
that Section 5 “shift[ed] the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil 
to its victim.”245 Prior to the passage of the VRA, states could stay ahead of the courts 
“by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been struck 
down.”246 In his NAMUDNO v. Holder dissent, Justice Thomas applied a standard similar 
to that of the appeals court, requiring that there be “current evidence of intentional 
discrimination with respect to voting.”247  Considering how far apart Justice Thomas and 
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the appeals court were in their opinions on the constitutionality of Section 5, their near 
agreement over how prevalent discrimination needs to be seems telling.  Should the Court 
choose to weigh in on the constitutionality of Section 5, they will likely use a similar bar, 
with the key point of contention being whether there needs to be evidence that the 
discrimination was “intentional.” 
 After deciding how prevalent discrimination needs to be, the Court must then 
determine what evidence to consider.  The two sides also disagree over what evidence is 
relevant.  For example, Shelby argues that vote dilution evidence should not be 
considered because Section 5 enforces the 15th Amendment, not the 14th Amendment.248  
The appeals court sided with the Attorney General and concluded that vote dilution 
evidence should be considered because “Congress expressly invoked its enforcement 
authority under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.”249  Additionally, the 
two sides disagree over whether Section 2 lawsuits should be considered as evidence of 
discrimination.  Shelby argues that evidence of successful Section 2 litigation should not 
be considered because Section 2, unlike the Constitution, does not require evidence of 
discriminatory intent.250  The appeals court disagreed, finding that “we cannot ignore the 
sheer number of successful section 2 cases—653 over 23 years, averaging more than 28 
each year.”251 
 In light of the complexity of the questions, the appeals court recommended 
deferring to the judgment of the legislative branch.   Congress had determined that 
“attempts to discriminate persist and evolve, such that Section 5 is still needed to protect 
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minority voters in the future.”252  The appeals court found, though, that the record is “by 
no means unambiguous.”253  Due to the importance of protecting the right to vote, the 
appeals court said it “owe[s] much deference to the considered judgment of the People’s 
elected representatives.”254  Of course, not everyone agrees that the judiciary should defer 
to Congress’s decision that Section 5 is needed.  In oral arguments, Justice Scalia said 
“whenever a society adopts racial entitlements, it is very difficult to get out of them 
through the normal political processes.”255   He believed that Section 5 “will be reenacted 
in perpetuity unless a court can say it does not comport with the Constitution.”256 
 
3.4.4 Is bailout sufficient relief for jurisdictions? 
Even if the Court decides that the coverage formula is not well tailored to target 
the jurisdictions where racial discrimination is most prevalent, the Court could still 
uphold the formula by finding that the bailout and bail-in provisions are not overly 
burdensome.   Under Section 3(c), any jurisdiction can be required to obtain preclearance 
for future voting changes if a federal court finds that the jurisdiction has engaged in 
voting discrimination.257  Under Section 4(a), a covered jurisdiction or subjurisdiction 
can bailout of the coverage requirements if it can demonstrate that it has complied with 
“the specified non-discrimination requirements for ten years.”258  The Attorney General 
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argues that these bailout and bail-in procedures “address any potential over- and under-
inclusiveness attributable to using the Section 4(b) criteria.259   
Shelby County, however, argues that bailout “can at best ameliorate over-
inclusiveness only at the margin.”260  The bailout requirements, Shelby County argues, 
are “highly subjective” and DOJ requires “onerous non-statutory conditions.”261  Shelby 
argues that this is why very few jurisdictions (about 1%) have bailout of coverage since 
1982.262  With bailout providing relief for so few jurisdictions, Shelby says that it “cannot 
possibly solve the formula’s massive over and under-inclusiveness problems.”263  The 
appeals court was unconvinced by this logic, saying that “absent evidence that there are 
‘clean’ jurisdictions that would like to bail out but cannot meet the standards, the low 
bailout rate tells us nothing about the effectiveness of the bailout provision.”264  
 
3.5 Possible Outcomes of Shelby v. Holder 
 
Before the Court ruled in Shelby, I evaluated the likelihood of possible outcomes of the 
case.  I ordered my analysis from greatest to least change from the status quo.  Under 
each outcome, I also evaluated how likely Justice Kennedy was to reach that decision.  I 
focused on Justice Kennedy, because, like many other scholars, I believed he will be in 
the majority no matter what the decision was.265 
                                                          
259 Brief for Respondents at 4. 
260 Brief for the Petitioner at 54. 
261 Brief for the Petitioner at 56. 
262 Brief for the Petitioner at 54. 
263 Brief for the petitioner at 55. 
264 679 F. 3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
265 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the VRA in the Hands of a Conservative Court Duke 
Journal of Constitutional Law 5:125-158, 153: “It is no secret that the future of the Act rests in the hands 
of Justice Kennedy.”  See also Lincoln Caplan, Will Justice Kennedy Vote for Voting Rights? The New York 
45 
 
 
 
3.5.1  Declare the entire Voting Rights Act unconstitutional 
The Court could declare the entire Voting Rights Act unconstitutional, but this is 
extremely unlikely.  Doing so would be a drastic step far beyond what Shelby is even 
asking the Court to do.  Shelby is only seeking “a declaration that Section 5 and Section 
4(b) are facially unconstitutional and a permanent injunction prohibiting the Attorney 
General from enforcing those provisions.”266 Although the Court has the power to make a 
broader decision than is being sought by Shelby, such a decision would deviate from 
previous statements made by Justice Kennedy acknowledging the need for the Voting 
Rights Act.  In NAMUDNO, Justice Kennedy said that: 
“No one questions the validity, the urgency, the essentiality of the Voting Rights 
Act.  The question is whether or not it should be continued with this 
differentiation between the states.”267 
 
Additionally, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 
Justice Kennedy criticized Justice Robert’s majority opinion: 
“The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has 
in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race.  The 
plurality’s postulate that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is 
to stop discrimination of race” is not sufficient to decide these cases.”268 
 
From these comments, it is clear that Justice Kennedy’s views on race deviate from those 
of his conservative colleges.  He is far more sympathetic to the need to empower the 
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federal government to protect minority rights.   While Justice Kennedy may someday 
agree that consideration of race is unnecessary, now does not seem to be that time:  “[t]he 
enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too often it does.”269 
Additionally, Shelby has relied on the power of Sections 2 and 3 to argue that 
Section 5 is unnecessary, a position that Justice Kennedy seemed to agree with in oral 
arguments.  For example, Shelby argued that Section 5 is unnecessary because “Section 2 
is an effective way of redressing vote dilution.”270  Furthermore, Shelby has said that 
“[e]specially in conjunction with Section 3’s bail-in mechanism, which can be utilized to 
remedy a judicial finding that a jurisdiction has violated constitutional voting rights, 
Section 2 is now the ‘appropriate’ prophylactic remedy for any pattern of discrimination 
that Congress documented in the 2006 legislative record.”271  Similarly, Justice Kennedy 
said “a Section 2 case can, in effect, have an order for bail-in, correct me if I’m wrong, 
under Section 3 and then you basically have…something that replicates Section 5.”272 
Based on Justice Kennedy’s prior comments and the arguments Shelby has presented, 
only Sections 4 and 5 appear at risk.   
 
3.5.2  Throw out both Sections 4 and 5. 
Throwing out both Sections 4 and 5 would be an unnecessarily bold move.  If the 
Court finds Section 4 unconstitutional, then it does not need to rule on Section 5.273  
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Without Section 4, Section 5 becomes unenforceable.  Throwing out just Section 4 does, 
however, leave the door open for Congress to pass a revised coverage formula.  If the 
Court is certain that Section 5 could not be upheld under any coverage formula, then they 
may want to strike it down now to prevent the unnecessary hassle of future legislation 
and litigation.  Justice Thomas made clear that he supports overturning Section 5 even 
when doing so is not necessary.  He found that “the extensive pattern of discrimination 
that led the Court to previously uphold Section 5 as enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment 
no longer exists,”274  and he has said that overturning preclearance would be “[a]n 
acknowledgement of Section 5’s unconstitutionality represents a fulfillment of” the 
Fifteenth Amendment’s “guarantee that no citizen would be denied the right to vote 
based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude…”275  But, Justice Kennedy has 
expressed very different beliefs.  He’s said that “racial discrimination and racially 
polarized voting are not ancient history” and that “[m]uch remains to be done to ensure 
that citizens of all races have equal opportunity.”276  Based on these views, discussed in 
more detail below, Kennedy seems unlikely to strike down Section 5, especially when a 
ruling on Section 5 is unnecessary.   
   
3.5.3  Declare only Section 5 unconstitutional. 
The Court could decide to rule on Section 5 and avoid Section 4, as Justice 
Thomas did in his NAMUDNO dissent, where he said that “Section 5 exceeds Congress’ 
power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.”277  Doing this would have the same impact 
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as throwing out both Sections 4 and 5, and would end the pre-clearance requirement.   It 
seems unlikely, though, that Justice Kennedy will overturn Section 5.   
In recent years, Justice Kennedy’s rhetoric on race issues has changed.  Those 
who believe Justice Kennedy will overturn Section 5 often note his opinion in Georgia v. 
Ashcroft: “[r]ace cannot be the predominant factor in redistricting,” but “considerations 
of race that would doom a redistricting plan under the Fourteenth Amendment or Section 
2 seem to be what save it under Section 5.”278  However, more recently, Justice 
Kennedy’s “views began to shift” into “a far more accommodating view on questions of 
race.”279 He has said there is a “legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people 
have equal opportunity regardless of their race.”280 Based on these more recent 
comments, Justice Kennedy seems unlikely to decide that discrimination is not 
sufficiently widespread enough to justify Section 5’s preclearance requirement. 
Additionally, Justice Kennedy has been sympathetic to the argument of relying on 
bail-in to determine which jurisdictions are covered by Section 5, implying that Section 5 
itself is constitutional.  For example, he’s said that “[i]t seems to me that the government 
can very easily bring a Section 2 suit and as part of that ask for bail-in under Section 
3.”281 Additionally, he’s said that “a Section 2 case can, in effect, have an order for bail-
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in, correct me if I’m wrong, under Section 3 and then you basically have a mini—
something that replicated Section 5.”282  These comments suggest that Justice Kennedy 
takes issue with the coverage formula, not the preclearance requirements. 
 
3.5.4  Declare only Section 4 unconstitutional. 
The most likely outcome appears to be the Court finding Section 4 
unconstitutional and challenging Congress to write a new coverage formula.  Barring the 
unlikely event that the currently deeply-divided Congress could pass a new coverage 
formula, such a ruling would have the same effect as finding Section 5 unconstitutional 
and would end the preclearance requirement.  By avoiding a ruling on Section 5, the 
Court could place the blame for ending the preclearance requirement on Congress’s 
dysfunction.  In his appeals court dissent, which was clearly aimed at Justice Kennedy, 
Judge Williams reached this conclusion, finding Section 4 unconstitutional and avoiding 
ruling on Section 5.283   
In addition to comments supporting the idea that bail-in replace the coverage 
formula (see above), Justice Kennedy has also directly criticized Section 4: 
“the Congress has made a finding that the sovereignty of Georgia is less than the 
sovereign dignity of Ohio. The sovereignty of Alabama, is less than the sovereign 
dignity of Michigan. And the governments in one area to be trusted less than the 
governments than the other.”284 
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This devastating critique of the coverage formula is matched by an equally harsh 
description of the bailout provisions:  
“It’s like Eurystheus keeps telling Hercules, ‘Oh, you did a good job, but now 
you’ve got another – got another thing to do.’  That’s the bailout provision.  
Anybody who has tried to fill out a government form realized they make a 
mistake, so that the DOJ rejects it,that counts as a rejection.  You have to have a – 
what, a clean record for how many – how many years – before you can preclear? I 
mean, this is simply impracticable.  And it seems to me a cornerstone of the Act 
and of your argument for upholding the Act, and if we find that it doesn’t work, 
that it’s just – it’s just an illusion, that gives me serious pause.”285 
 
Based on Justice Kennedy’s criticisms of Section 4, it seems highly likely that he will 
find Section 4 unconstitutional. 
 
3.5.5  Uphold all sections of the Voting Rights Act 
The Court could also uphold all sections of the Voting Rights Act.  Such a ruling 
could validate the law as it is understood now or could require the bail-out requirements 
be expanded.  This would be the ruling that supporters of the law would prefer, but 
during oral arguments even the liberal members of the court seemed doubtful that this 
would happen.  Instead, they seemed to think it more likely that their conservative 
colleagues could be convinced that that Shelby does not have standing and therefore they 
should ruling on the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act (see below).286 
 
3.5.6  Find that Shelby does not have standing 
Finally, the Supreme Court could take a pass on the constitutional questions just 
as they did in NAMUDNO.  This is the outcome that the liberal justices seemed to be 
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pushing for during oral arguments.287 The basis of the ruling would be that, because 
Shelby is not eligible for bailout, it does not have standing to challenge the Voting Rights 
Act.  As Justice Sotomayor told Shelby County’s lawyer, “you may be the wrong party 
bringing this.”288  Justice Kagan pointed out that “[u]nder any formula that Congress 
could devise, it would capture Alabama.”  Shelby conceded this point, prompting Justice 
Kennedy to ask “[i]f you would be covered under any formula that most likely would be 
drawn, why are you injured under this one?”  The Court could find that only an unjustly 
covered district has standing to challenge the coverage formula.  This would effectively 
punt on the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act for another day.  The Court may be 
reluctant to take this option for two reasons.  One, they would likely be criticized for 
avoiding ruling on Section 5 so soon after they previously avoided it in NAMUDNO. 
Two, doing so would be unlikely to delay a decision on the constitutionality of the Voting 
Rights Act for long, because a similar challenge would likely make it to the Supreme 
Court very soon.289 
 
3.6 The Supreme Court’s Holding in Shelby 
In a 5-4 decision, Justice Kennedy joined the Court’s conservative block to find 
the coverage formula unconstitutional just as I predicted.  Likewise, the majority opinion, 
written by Justice Roberts, did not issue a holding on the constitutionality of any other 
section, including Section 5.  In a concurrence, Justice Thomas wrote that he would also 
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find Section 5 unconstitutional.  Writing for the liberal block, Justice Ginsburg wrote that 
she would defer to Congress’s judgment and uphold the Voting Rights Act. 
 
3.6.1 The Majority Opinion and Justice Thomas’s Concurrence 
Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts held that using 40-year-old data to 
construct the coverage formula was irrational.290  Citing voting data, he argued that 
“things have changed dramatically” since the Voting Rights Act was passed.  Despite 
hints that Section 5 could be unconstitutional, the majority issued no holding on either on 
any section other than Section 4.   
 The majority struck down the coverage formula based on the use of “decades-old 
data relevant to decades-old problems, rather than current data reflecting current 
needs.”291  Because the burdens of Section 5 are so great, Justice Roberts holds that 
Congress must single out jurisdictions for coverage “on a basis that makes sense in light 
of current conditions.”  Congress “cannot rely simply on the past.”  The extensive record 
of current discriminatory conditions that Congress collected is not sufficient to justify the 
formula because it did not shape the formula.292  Instead, the record’s reliance on second-
generation barriers, such as vote dilution, only “highlights the irrationality” of a coverage 
formula based on the first-generation barriers of voting tests and ballot access. 
 Interestingly, Justice Roberts chose to cite voting data to argue that “today’s 
statistics tell an entirely different story.”293  His opinion could have simply stated the fact 
that the data in the coverage formula was too old, but instead he used voting data to argue 
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that the world has changed greatly since the initial passage of the Voting Rights Act.  For 
example, the opinion notes that Census Bureau data indicate that Black turnout is higher 
than white turnout in five of the six states originally covered by Section 5.294  
Additionally, when summarizing the D.C. Circuit’s holding on Shelby, Justice Roberts 
cites several pieces of data from Judge William’s dissent.295  For example, he cites there 
being no positive correlation between being covered and having low Black registration.296  
Additional, Justice Roberts cites Judge William’s own disaggregation of data by state 
showing that the five worst uncovered jurisdictions have worse Section 2 records than 
eight of the covered jurisdictions.297  Justice Roberts even included a chart comparing 
voting registration data from 1965 to 2004, the most recent data available at the time of 
the reauthorization.298  Justice Robert’s decision to incorporate so much data into his 
opinion suggests that data will also be important to future challenges to the Voting Rights 
Act. 
 Although the opinion is silent as to the constitutionality of Section 5, Justice 
Robert’s hints that a revised coverage formula could not cover such a large portion of the 
United States.  Repeatedly throughout the opinion, Justice Roberts asserts that conditions 
have “dramatically improved” since the Voting Rights Act was passed.299  Despite these 
improvements, the VRA’s “unusual remedies have grown even stronger.”300  Justive 
Robert’s also quotes Katzebach in saying that the coverage formula was rational when it 
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targeted jurisdictions characterized by voting discrimination “on a pervasive scale.”301  
The Chief Justice’s juxtaposition of more stringent Section 5 requirements against 
evidence of decreasing voter registration gaps suggests that he would consider there to be 
few jurisdictions where discrimination could be shown at levels justifying Section 5 
burdens.  This is important because, if Congress were to pass a revised coverage formula, 
a broad formula that covers many jurisdictions may also be held unconstitutional. 
In a one and one-half page concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote that he 
would also find Section 5 unconstitutional, a position he had previously taken in 
NAMUDNO.  In a departure from the majority opinion, he argues that even if “one 
aggregates the data [on voting discrimination] compiled by Congress, it cannot justify the 
considerable burdens created by Section 5.”302  Justice Thomas argues that the 
preclearance requirement was an extraordinary measure that can only be justified to 
address pervasive discrimination, which no longer exists.  By issuing no holding on 
Section 5, the majority, he argues, “needlessly prolongs [its] demise.”303  
 
3.6.2 The Minority Opinion 
In a scathing dissent read from the bench, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Voting 
Rights Act should be upheld.304  The dissent heavily cited evidence of ongoing racial 
discrimination in voting.  Additionally, the dissent criticizes the majority for placing a 
“double burden” on defenders of legislation, requiring them to show not only evidence of 
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discrimination in covered jurisdictions but also to disprove the existence of comparable 
discrimination elsewhere.305  Furthermore, the dissent argues that Shelby’s purely facial 
challenge to the VRA cannot succeed because Alabama has a sufficient history of 
discrimination to warrant coverage.306 
Demonstrating how strongly she disagreed with the majority, Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent is filled with stinging language.  For example, she says that “[h]ubris is a fit word 
for today’s demolition of the VRA.”307  Likewise, she said that the majority’s opinion 
“can hardly be described as an exemplar of restrained and moderate decisionmaking.”308 
Furthermore, she criticized the logic of “throwing out preclearance when it . . . is 
continuing to work” as equivalent to “throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm 
because you are not getting wet.”309 Moreover, to argue that racially polarized voting in 
covered jurisdictions justifies preclearance, Justice Ginsburg says the logic is as clear as 
“buildings in California hav[ing] a greater need to be earthquake-proof.”310  Justice 
Ginsburg’s sharp rebuke suggests that no one on the Court’s liberal wing will be voting 
down any provisions of the Voting Rights Act for a very long time. 
  
3.6.3 Evaluating my Predictions 
As I predicted, the Court found the coverage formula unconstitutional.  
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy was the swing vote in a 5-4 decision along partisan lines. 
As I expected, the Court was silent the constitutionality of every other section.  The 
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decision, though, departs from my prediction that the Court would use the opportunity to 
heighten the standard of review.  Instead, the decision found that Section 4 is irrational.  
This is important because a heightened standard of review would have lowered the bar 
for future cases challenging other sections of the Voting Rights Act.  Although the 
rational basis standard of review might not be enough to save Section 5 from a future 
challenge, it makes Section 2 less likely to be found unconstitutional.  If the majority had 
wanted to lay the groundwork for finding Section 2 or the entire Voting Rights Act 
unconstitutional, they would likely have raised the standard of review to congruent and 
proportional. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed Shelby v. Holder and the key questions that I 
predicted could affect how the justices would rule.  Then, I discussed my previous 
predictions about the likelihood of possible outcomes of the case.  Finally, I analyzed 
each of the opinions and evaluated the accuracy of my predictions.  As I predicted, the 
Court found Section 4 unconstitutional and challenged Congress to devise a new 
coverage formula.  Had the Court found a provision of the VRA unconstitutional in a 
previous, less-polarized Congress, a new coverage formula would likely have been 
enacted quickly.  Unfortunately, the current Congress may be unable to rise above the 
partisan divide to update the coverage formula.  As long as Congressional inaction 
continues, the preclearance requirement is essentially neutralized.  Fortunately for 
supporters of the Voting Rights Act, many other paths forward exist, including relying on 
the bail-in proving and strengthening other sections of the Voting Rights Act.  
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Chapter 4 
 
The VRA Post-Shelby: A “Carrot and Stick” 
Path Forward 
 
 
4.1 Overview  
This chapter discusses developments since the Court announced its decision in 
Shelby, including the Justice Department’s response and proposals to amend the Voting 
Rights Act.  I evaluate proposals to amend Section 3 and Section 4.  I suggest an 
alternative path that combines an amendment of Section 3 with a grant competition to 
encourage states to voluntarily take actions that would protect voting rights.   
 
4.2 Introduction 
Since the Supreme Court declared Section 4 unconstitutional in Shelby, countless 
proposals have been offered to strengthen protections of minority voting rights.  The 
initial reaction was a rush to understand what provisions of the Voting Rights Act 
remained.  Section 3, a previously rarely used provision to bail-in jurisdictions, suddenly 
became immensely important.  Within one month of the Court’s decision, the Justice 
Department announced it would file a lawsuit to bail-in Texas.311  At the same time, 
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legislators in previously covered jurisdictions rushed to change their voting laws.312  For 
many VRA supporters, this was further evidence that new amendments to the Voting 
Rights Act were needed.  A wide range of proposals have been suggested, including 
writing a new coverage formula for Section 4 and expanding Section 3.  I argue that the 
former is too politically charged to garner the necessary Republican votes.  Instead, I 
propose adopting a “carrot and stick” approach that expands Section 3 to punish state’s 
for violating the Voting Rights Act but also creates a competitive grant program to 
encourage states to voluntarily take actions that would protect voting rights. 
 
4.3 Responses to Shelby 
 The magnitude of the decision in Shelby was felt immediately.  States quickly 
enacted dozens of new voting laws that had previously been blocked by Section 5.  
Within a month, the Justice Department sued to bail-in the entire state of Texas.  At the 
same time, members of Congress began working on new amendments to the Voting 
Rights Act. 
 
4.3.1 New State Voting Laws 
 States wasted no time in enacting new state voting laws that would have 
previously been prohibited by Section 5.  On the same day that the Shelby ruling was 
announced by the Court, officials in Texas announced that they would implement a strict 
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photo identification law which had previously been blocked by Section 5.313  North 
Carolina not only enacted a voter identification requirement, but also significantly cut 
back on early voting and shortened the voter registration window.314  Likewise, Alabama 
and Mississippi began to enforce previously-passed voter identification laws that had 
been blocked by the preclearance requirement.315,316  In 2013 and the first half of 2014, 
ten of the fifteen states previously covered by Section 5 enacted new legislation that the 
Brennan Center for Justice says would make it more difficult for minorities to cast a 
ballot.317 
 States were not the only ones making election law changes; many local 
jurisdictions have sought to do the same.  For example, in Georgia, some municipal 
elections will no longer be held on the traditional election day in November.318  A similar 
proposal had previously been blocked by Section 5 because doing so would 
disproportionately reduce Black turnout.319  Additionally, in Pasadena, Texas, voters 
approved a plan to scrap the current city council districts and to move to an at-large city 
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council.320  Although 60% of the city’s population is Latino, the move will likely 
eliminate the ability of Latinos to elect a candidate of their choice.321 
 
4.3.2 The Justice Department’s Offensive 
 Within a month of the Court’s Shelby decision, the Department of Justice began 
an offensive to broaden the reach of Section 3 and the protections of Section 2.  Attorney 
General Eric Holder personally announced that his department would sue under Section 3 
to bail-in Texas.322  The case for bail-in would be based on a decision the prior year that 
held that a Texas redistricting plan intentionally discriminated against Hispanic voters.323  
In North Carolina, the Justice Department sued under Section 2 to block a law that would 
require photo identification to vote, eliminate the first week of early voting, and eliminate 
same-day voter registration during early voting.324  The case is still pending trial, but 
officials at the Justice Department were disappointed that the judge did not grant them an 
injunction to prevent the law from affecting the 2014 election.325 
 The Justice Department also joined two Section 2 cases challenging voting laws 
in Wisconsin and Ohio.326  The Ohio case challenges not only a directive from Ohio’s 
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Republican Secretary of State that limits early voting hours but also a law that shortens 
the early voting period and eliminates same-day registration.327  The lawsuit was brought 
by the American Civil Liberties Union, the Ohio NAACP, and several predominantly 
Black churches.328  The Wisconsin case concerns a voter identification law that was 
passed in 2011.329  A district court held for the ACLU of Wisconsin and struck down the 
voter identification law as violating Section 2 and the 14th Amendment.330  The case is 
currently on appeal before the 7th Circuit, where a 3-judge panel stayed the district court’s 
injunction.331  Wisconsin is now free to enforce the law for the 2014 election.332   
In all four of these cases, in Texas, Wisconsin, Ohio, and North Carolina, 
potential appeals to the Supreme Court are being contemplated.333 
 
4.3.3 Congressional Attempts to Amend the Voting Rights Act 
 After the Shelby decision, several members of Congress immediately began 
calling for new amendments to the Voting Rights Act.  In the weeks following the 
decision, Republican Representative James Sensenbrenner joined with Democratic 
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Representative and civil rights leader John Lewis to call for Congressional action.334  At 
the same time, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor began discussions with Democrats.335  
In January of the following year, Reps. Jim Sensenbrenner and John Conyers and Sen. 
Patrick Leahy introduced an amendment in Congress.336  The bill has been stalled in 
committee by House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte.337  As recently as 
March 2014, Eric Cantor was seen as leading the effort to deliver the necessary 
Republican votes.338  Those efforts came to a sudden and surprising end in June, when 
Eric Cantor lost his primary election.339  Needing a new conservative to champion the 
bill, the Congressional Black Caucus has put pressure on Sen. Thad Cochran, who relied 
on Black votes to fend off a tea party challenger in his primary election.340  Thus far, Sen. 
Cochran has not endorsed the need for an amendment and has only said that he is 
“listening” to the conversation.341 
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4.4 Possible Congressional Action – A New Coverage Formula 
 The most obvious response to the Court’s decision is to simply write a new 
coverage formula.  Indeed, the first and thus far only bill in Congress to respond to 
Shelby does so, among other changes.  Any new coverage formula, though, is likely to be 
too controversial to pass Congress. 
   
4.4.1 Voting Rights Amendments of 2014 
 Reps. Jim Sensenbrenner and John Conyers have joined with Sen. Patrick Leahy 
to sponsor the Voting Rights Act of 2014.342  Among other changes, the bill would create 
a new coverage formula.343  A state can be covered if it has committed five voting 
violations in the previous 15 years and at least one violation was committed directly by 
the state.344  A political subdivision can be covered if it has committed three violations in 
the past 15 years.345  Alternatively, a subdivision may be covered if it has had only one 
violation but also has a history of extremely low minority voter turnout.346  Violations 
include a court judgment that the jurisdiction has violated federal voting laws, the 14th 
Amendment or the 15th Amendments.347  Additionally, a failure or denial of pre-clearance 
under Section 5 or Section 3 also counts as a violation.348  Any violations caused by voter 
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identification laws, however, would not be counted.349  Coverage would last for 10 years 
unless the jurisdiction bails-out.350  Under the new formula, just four states would be 
covered: Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.351   
Additionally, the bill would strengthen Section 3, which is discussed in detail 
below in section 4.4.2.  The bill would also require states and localities to give the media 
and the public advance notice of election changes and it would expand the Attorney 
General’s authority to dispatch election observers.352  For Section 2 cases, the bill would 
lower the burden of proof that plaintiffs are required to show to obtain an injunction.353 
 
4.4.2 Political Difficulties 
 Although the proposed coverage formula is much more targeted than the previous 
formula, amending the formula has largely been a non-starter in Congress due to the 
stigma attached to it.  In the four decades since the Voting Rights Act was passed, the 
coverage formula has come to be seen by many Republicans as punishing the South for 
“ancient sins.”354  Rather than criticize the criteria of the proposed formula, Republicans 
have largely opposed the use of any formula at all.  Senator John Cornyn said that any 
voting law “should apply to the entire country” rather than “impose[] a presumption of 
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guilt.”355  Senator Chuck Grassley has said that voting rights are sufficiently protected by 
the remaining sections of the Voting Rights Act.356  Rep. Bob Goodlatte, the House 
Judiciary Committee chair, is thought to agree with Sen. Grassley.357  Many Republicans 
seem to agree with these sentiments.  Although the House bill has 164 Democratic 
cosponsors, it has only 11 Republican cosponsors.358  In the Senate, the bill has 11 
Democratic cosponsors, but not one single Republican cosponsor.359  With so much 
Republican opposition to revising the coverage formula, it is not surprising that the bill 
has stalled in committee.360   
 
4.5 Possible Congressional Action – Expanding Bail-in 
 A more promising avenue is to amend Section 3 so that intentional discrimination 
need not be proved to bail-in a jurisdiction.  Although this lower bar for bail-in would not 
be a perfect substitute for a revised coverage formula due to the high costs of litigation, it 
is much more likely to pass, especially if the courts deny the DOJ’s request to bail-in 
Texas.   
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4.5.1 Fulfilling Justice Kennedy’s Understanding of Section 3  
 Section 3 currently only allows a jurisdiction to be bailed-in if the jurisdiction 
intentionally discriminated against minority voters.  This is a very high bar.  When the 
Supreme Court, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, interpreted Section 2 as requiring a showing 
that the right to vote was denied or abridged intentionally, Congress quickly amended 
Section 2 to prohibit any procedure that “results in a denial or abridgement.”361  The 
speed with which Congress reacted to lower the bar for Section 2 demonstrates that 
Congress has historically considered intentional discrimination to be a very high bar.  For 
a revision Section 3, violations of Section 2 would be added as a coverage trigger, rather 
than mirror the way Congress amended the language of Section 2.  It is important to note 
that during oral arguments Justice Kennedy seemed to think violations of Section 2 
already could trigger coverage under Section 3.  Justice Kennedy, when speaking to 
Shelby County’s lawyer, said: 
 “But I do have this question: Can you tell me – it seems to me that 
the government can very easily bring a Section 2 suit and as part of that 
ask for bail-in under Section 3.  Are those expensive, time-consuming 
suits?”362 
 
Shelby’s lawyer sidestepped the question by responding that Section 2 is a very 
effective remedy.363  Justice Kennedy posted the same question to a lawyer from the 
Legal Defense Fund.364  There he said: 
“But a Section 2 case can, in effect, have an order for bail-in, correct me if 
I’m wrong, under Section 3 and then you basically have a mini – 
something that replicates Section 5.”365 
                                                          
361 J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-2007, Tex. L. 
Rev. 86(4): 670, 709 (2008). 
362 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 570 U.S. ___  (Argued Feb. 23, 2013). 
363 Id. 
364 Id. 
365 Id. 
67 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, the lawyer did not explicitly explain the necessity of 
demonstrating intentional discrimination.366  Instead, he explained that “bail-in is 
available if there’s an actual finding of a constitutional violation.”367  While those who 
have studied Section 3 closely know that this constitutional trigger is where the 
requirement for a showing of intentional discrimination comes from, it seems likely that 
Justice Kennedy was unfamiliar with this nuance.  Rather than explain this point in detail, 
the lawyer reiterated that Section 2 is an inadequate remedy.368 
From Justice Kennedy’s line of questioning, it seems apparent that he thought 
Section 3 already included violations of Section 2 as a trigger.  His suggestion that 
Section 3 could replicate Section 5 suggests that he was more comfortable finding 
Section 4 unconstitutional knowing that Section 3 could be used in its place.  Based on 
these comments, it seems likely that he would uphold an amendment to Section 3 that 
carried out his previous understanding of it.  The current proposal in Congress adds not 
just violations of Section 2, but also violations of any provision of the Voting Rights Act 
and violations of any federal voting rights law that prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of race color or membership in a language minority group. 
 
4.5.2 A More Politically Acceptable Amendment 
Amending Section 3 seems much more politically feasible than writing a new 
coverage formula.  Unlike Section 4, Section 3 has never been as controversial.  Indeed, 
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Republicans have pointed to Section 3 as evidence that Section 4 is not necessary.369  The 
concept of bail-in is not considered fundamentally offensive by Southerners, whereas a 
coverage formula is. 
Ironically, the best chance to generate political will to support amending Section 3 
would likely come from the Department of Justice losing in its current effort to bail-in 
Texas.  If the DOJ wins the case, many Republicans will say it is evidence that the 
Voting Rights Act remains strong and does not need to be amended.  It would be very 
risky, though, for the DOJ to intentionally throw the case in order to pressure Congress to 
amend Section 3.  Doing so could create a precedent that would make it difficult to bail-
in any other jurisdictions and would make Congressional action an absolute necessity.  
This is especially true because Texas is the jurisdiction where the DOJ has the strongest 
record of intentional discrimination.370  As Justin Levitt has said, “If you can make the 
case for [intentional] discrimination anywhere, you can make it there.”371  With such 
large stakes, betting on Congressional action would be risky to say the least. 
 
4.6 Possible Congressional Action – A Carrot and a Stick 
 With voter identification laws, voter registration purges, and reductions of early 
voting days all over the news, many have called for broad voting rights protections. At 
the same time, it is not surprising that Senators reluctant to amend the Voting Rights Act 
because it is entirely a punishment mechanism.  The push to pass legislation in response 
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to Shelby presents a great opportunity to pass additional measures to protect voting rights 
that do not explicitly rely on racial discrimination and instead reward states for good 
election and voting practices.  A bill that combines a “carrot” with a “stick” would both 
be the most likely to pass politically and also the best way to advance voter protections. 
 The Supreme Court’s conservative majority has made it very clear that they are 
uncomfortable thinking along racial lines.  This was made most evidence by the line of 
cases following Bartlett v. Strickland that limit the ability of legislators to redistrict based 
on race when they are not required to do so by Section 2.372  Numerous scholars have 
worried that the Court will throw out Section 2 in the near future; indeed, many thought 
the Court would do so in Shelby.  Future litigants may still seek to have the entire Voting 
Rights Act thrown out, including Section 2.373  Supporters of voting rights would be wise 
to begin preparing for such a day by enacting alternative protections of voting that do not 
explicitly rely on race.   
 Such a plan would need to be amenable to Republicans.  A federal law to require 
improved election procedures by states would likely be opposed by Republicans as 
imposing on states’ rights to control their own election procedures.  Even if such a law 
passed, it would be need to be limited to federal elections in order to be constitutional.  
Because of these limitations, a proscriptive law is unlikely to be the best path forward. 
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 Instead, a voting rights “carrot” that incentivizes states to voluntarily improve 
their election procedures, à la Race to the Top, seems much more likely to pass Congress 
and could reach state and local election procedures.  Like Race to the Top, the law should 
award multiple grants in multiple rounds, with grant sizes that are proportional to state 
populations.  Instead of detailing specific actions for states to take, the contest should be 
based on meeting goals.  Specifying exactly what those goals should be is a task for 
another paper; here, I will simply give examples.  One goal might be reducing the 
average wait time to vote in a federal election to below 15 minutes, with no more than, 
say, 2% of voters waiting more than 60 minutes.  For voter identification laws, a goal 
might be for the state’s voter registration list to include pictures of voters gathered from 
DMV lists and pictures taken on election day.  To combat the effort to limit early voting 
days, a goal might be to meet a minimum number of early voting hours on nights and 
weekends.  Another goal might be to collect better data on election administration.  The 
specifics of the grant competition likely need not be spelled out in the law and could be 
left to a revived Election Assistance Commission. 
 The most likely aspect of this plan to generate Republican opposition is the 
funding aspect.  The benefit of a competition is that states will likely expend some of 
their own money in order to have a better chance of winning the federal funding.  
Additionally, the funding could be contingent on a matching percentage from the state of, 
say, 15%.  Thus, the cost should be less than it would be to directly pay for states to make 
these changes.  For perspective, Race to the Top received $4.35 billion, which pales in 
comparison to the $632 billion spent nationwide on pre-K to 12 education.374  To 
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sufficiently incentivize states to participate, at least $1 billion would likely be needed, but 
preferably over $2 billion would be allocated.  Grants need to be large to grasp the 
attention of state legislators and numerous enough to seem winnable.  By being less 
expensive than past election reforms (over $3.5 billion has been spent on HAVA) and 
respecting states’ rights to conduct elections, this competition should garner Republican 
support. 
 Combining this “carrot” of competitive grants with the “stick” of a revised 
Section 3 could yield a bill that appeals to both Democrats and Republicans and that 
responds to both the holes in the Voting Rights Act created by Shelby and the need for 
voting reforms that reach beyond race.  An opportune time to pass this legislation is 
during the lame-duck session after the 2014 Midterm Elections.  At that point, 
Republicans can rest assured that voters cannot immediately punish them for such a vote, 
as they could if the bill were considered prior to the election.  It would give Republicans 
a chance, though, to court minority voters.  In Sen. Thad Cochran’s primary race, Black 
voters demonstrated that they are willing to vote for Republican establishment candidates 
to fend off tea party primary challengers.  Incumbent Republicans would be wise to 
openly embrace a Voting Rights Amendment to thank Black voters and solidify similar 
support in future elections.  Additionally, by passing a bill that focuses on improving 
voting procedures overall, not just covering Southern states, Republicans could also court 
Hispanic voters.  Florida, a state with a large Cuban population, has some of longest wait 
times to vote in the nation.375  Republicans could improve their image among Hispanics 
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by reducing wait times in Hispanic areas, a topic especially likely to be on voters’ minds 
in the weeks following the election. 
 
4.7 Implications of Shelby on Section 2 
For the time being, the bulk of VRA litigation will come under Section 2.  Section 
3’s intentional discrimination requirement means that very few jurisdictions are even 
candidates for bail-in litigation.  Without the preclearance process to prevent 
discriminatory practices, the volume of Section 2 litigation will likely increase 
dramatically, as Section 2 litigation will be needed to combat discriminatory laws on a 
case-by-case basis.  This increases the importance not only of Section 2, but also of 
estimates of racially polarized voting.  The need to produce estimates of racially 
polarized voting will be one of the factors limiting the number of Section 2 cases.  
Indeed, the director of the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund has called 
the production of racially polarized voting estimates “an enormous hurdle.”376  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed developments since the Court’s decision in 
Shelby.  I have argued that amendments to Section 4 are unlikely to pass due to the 
stigma Republicans attach to the coverage formula.  Instead, I have argued that amending 
Section 3 to include Section 2 violations as a trigger is a more promising alternative.  
This is especially true because Justice Kennedy’s questions during oral arguments 
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suggest that he thought Section 3 already included such a provision.  I proposed a novel 
path forward that combines an amendment of Section 3 with a grant competition to 
encourage states to voluntarily take actions that would protect voting rights.  If Congress 
is unable to pass any legislation, Section 2 litigation will be relied upon even more and 
the importance of accurate estimates of racially polarized voting will increase.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Redistricting and the Role of Racially Polarized 
Voting 
 
 
5.1 Overview 
 In this chapter, I explain the constitutional requirement to reapportion 
Congressional districts and the Supreme Court cases that caused the need for equal 
population districts.  Then, I discuss how the Voting Rights Act protect minority voting 
rights in redistricting.  The Supreme Court’s three-prong test for determining when 
majority-minority districts should be drawn is laid out.  The difficulty of estimating one 
of those prongs, racially polarized voting, is highlighted.  
 
5.2 Introduction 
Over the last five decades, the federal government has gone to great lengths to 
enable minorities to be heard in the political process.  In 1965, Congress passed the 
landmark Voting Rights Act of 1965.  The law gave the federal government broad new 
powers to end the discriminatory voting practices that were used to disenfranchise 
minority voters.   Congress has subsequently revised and reauthorized the law, doing so 
most recently in 2006.  The wide-sweeping law has many provisions, but one of the most 
significant ways that minority votes are protected is by the prohibition against denying or 
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abridging the rights of minorities to vote.  The Supreme Court has interpreted this as 
prohibiting jurisdictions from cracking minority communities into several majority white 
districts in order to limit their ability to elect minority candidates.  In other words, 
minorities must have an equal opportunity to elect their candidates of choice.  States and 
other jurisdictions with a history of discrimination can be compelled by the courts to 
redraw district lines to create majority-minority districts.  The idea is that, with the 
majority of votes in a district, minorities will be able elect candidates they believe will 
represent their interests and give them a voice in the legislative process.  The 
requirement, though, only applies if it can be shown that voting is polarized along ethnic 
lines, which is no simple matter.   
 
5.3 Why Redistricting Occurs 
 Although states and localities are now required to redraw legislative districts 
every decade, for nearly 200 years no such requirement existed.  The United States 
Constitution is virtually silent on how districts should be drawn.  Article I Section 2 of 
the Constitution says that every decade Congressional seats shall be reapportioned among 
the states based on their respective numbers, as determined by a decennial census.   For 
nearly 200 years, the Constitution was interpreted as leaving the power to determine how 
districts should be drawn and who should draw them to the states.  A wide-variety of 
districting methods were undertaken.  Some states used at-large districts, while others 
allocated multiple representatives to a subset of districts.  The number of residents in a 
district varied greatly not only across states, but also within states.  Until the first half of 
the twentieth century, states had wide leeway to decide how to elect representatives.   
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Initially, the Supreme Court was reluctant to limit the redistricting power of 
states.   In Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), three Illinois voters sued the state 
because the Congressional districts had huge population disparities.  The largest 
Congressional district had over eight times the population of the smallest Congressional 
district (914,000 people vs 112, 116 people).  In a 4-3 decision, the Court held that 
redistricting was not judiciable.  Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter famously 
asserted that “Courts ought not to enter this political thicket.”  Instead, he suggested two 
alternative remedies: voters could “secure State legislatures that will apportion properly” 
or they could “invoke the ample powers of Congress.”  Both of these remedies require 
representatives of other districts (or other states) to stand up for the underrepresented, an 
unlikely outcome. 
 States continued abusing their redistricting power, and the Court felt compelled to 
step in when voters in Alabama were completely disenfranchised from municipal 
elections.  The Alabama state legislature had redrawn the boundaries of Tuskegee, 
Alabama from a square to a twenty-eight-sided figure that eliminated all but four or five 
of Tuskegee’s Black residents from the city limits.  In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 
339 (1960), Justice Frankfurter, again writing for the majority, found that redistricting is 
judiciable when it has been used “as an instrument for circumventing a federally 
protected right“, here the right to vote in municipal elections.  Because the ruling was 
based on the 15th Amendment’s protection of the right to vote and not the 14th 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, only a narrow precedent was set that did not 
cover population disparities. 
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 Only two years later, though, the Court expanded the judiciability of redistricting 
to included cases of wide population variances.  In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), 
the court departed from their previous decisions and found that redistricting was 
judiciable based on the 14th Amendment.   By basing the decision on the Equal Protection 
Clause, any districting scheme that treated voters unequally could now be challenged.  
The following year, in Gray v. Sanders, Justice Douglas coined the now famous phrase 
“one person, one vote” in a case that ruled that weighted voting was unconstitutional.    
 Two rulings in 1964 drastically limited states’ redistricting powers and compelled 
states to redraw jurisdictions after every census.  In Wesberry v. Sanders (1964), the 
Court found that Sections 2 and 4 of Article I of the U.S. Constitution require that 
Congressional districts be drawn with as close to equal populations as possible.  In 
Reynolds v. Sims (1964), the Supreme Court went further and found that the 14th 
Amendment requires that legislative districts at all levels of government need to have 
equal population levels.   Because the two cases were decided on different Constitutional 
grounds, the Court has said that different levels of variation will be tolerated.  For 
Congressional districts, any population deviation, no matter how small, must be justified.  
For state and local legislative districts, the Court has been willing to tolerate larger 
deviations.  Historically, a deviation of up to 10% has been presumed to be constitutional.   
To maintain population equality, States and localities are required to redraw districts after 
every decennial census.   
 Because of these landmark cases, the process of drawing legislative districts was 
forever changed.  After every census, states now need to redraw the lines in order to place 
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equal numbers of people in each district.  Any districting plan that fails to respect that 
requirement can be thrown out by the courts.   
 
5.4 How the Voting Rights Act Affects Redistricting 
 In response to the Voting Rights Act, Southerners switched from a policy of 
denying Blacks the right to vote to a policy of diluting their voting power.377  Often this 
was done through the newly-required redistricting process by racial gerrymandering.378  
That is the practice of redrawing the district lines to dilute Black voting strength.379  The 
most popular techniques were cracking, stacking, and packing.380  Cracking divides a 
Black population across multiple districts to prevent Blacks from having an effective 
voting majority in any district.381  Stacking means combining a Black population with a 
predominately white population to dilute the Black vote.  Packing is over-concentrating 
Blacks in a particular district to minimize the number of Black influence districts.382   
Section 5 has been of limited use in stopping these redistricting practices.  In Beer v. 
United States, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 5 as meaning that a redistricting 
plan is in violation of the VRA only if the plan reduces the ability of minorities to vote.383  
For example, if two of ten districts are majority-minority and the population is 55% 
minority, the jurisdiction cannot change the districts to reduce the number of majority-
minority districts to zero or one.  The district may, though, continue to have only 20% of 
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the districts be majority-minority.  Under Section 5, covered states are not required to 
increase minority representation—they are only prevented from decreasing it.  When the 
Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965, many covered jurisdictions had no majority-
minority districts.  For minorities in these communities, Section 5 does nothing to help 
them gain majority-minority districts. 
Initially, the text of Section 2 mirrored the 15th Amendment, which only 
redistricting plans that intentionally discriminated against minorities violated.  This 
interpretation was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Mobile v. Bolden 446 U.S. 55 
(1980).  Soon after the Court’s decision, Congress decided to broaden the power of 
Section 2 by amending it.  Accordingly, the 1982 reauthorization of the Voting Rights 
Act contained new Section 2 language that expanded its power to include laws with the 
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote.   Although this was clearly intended to 
increase minority representation beyond the status quo protections afforded by Section 5, 
Congress left it up to the courts to determine the circumstances under which jurisdictions 
would need to create majority-minority districts. 
 
5.5 Section 2, Gingles, and Redistricting 
 In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court interpreted the newly amended Section 2 
language as requiring the creation of a majority-minority district when certain criteria 
were met.384  The Court established a 3-prong test known as the Gingles Test.  To prove a 
Section 2 claim, a minority group must meet all 3-prongs of the test.385  The first prong 
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requires that the minority group be large and compact.386  In Bartlett v. Strickland, the 
Court defined large as meaning the minority group must constitute a numerical majority 
of the voting age population in the proposed district.387,388 The second prong is that the 
minority group must be politically cohesive.389  This means that members of the minority 
group unite behind a minority candidate of choice.390  The final Gingles prong requires 
that the majority group be politically cohesive and they must usually defeat the minority 
candidate of choice.391   
One additional criteria was explicitly required in the amended Section 2 language: 
consideration of the “totality of circumstances” when determining whether minorities 
have less opportunity to elect representatives of their choice.  If, in the totality of 
circumstances, minorities have equal opportunities to elect, then they do not have a 
Section 2 claim.  A variety of factors that could provide evidence of a lack of opportunity 
were suggested in a report by the Senate Judiciary Committee.392  These factors include: 
1. the history of official voting-related discrimination in the state or political 
subdivision; 
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is 
racially polarized; 
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used voting practices or 
procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the 
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minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority-vote 
requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting; 
4. the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; 
5. the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of discrimination in 
areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to 
participate effectively in the political process; 
6. the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and 
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public 
office in the jurisdiction. 
Additionally, the amended language of Section 2 says that the extent to which minorities 
have been elected to office may be considered as evidence.  If the totality of 
circumstances shows that discrimination in the jurisdiction exists and all three prongs of 
the Gingles test are met, then Section 2 requires that there be a majority-minority district.  
If no compact district can be drawn, then Section 2 does not require the creation of a 
majority-minority district and any district drawn with race as the predominant factor will 
be subject to strict scrutiny.393 
 
5.6 Racially Polarized Voting 
 Racially polarized voting refers to a correlation between the race of voters and the 
candidates they select.394  Estimates of racially polarized voting are important because 
they are necessary to satisfy the second and third Gingles prongs.395   
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Many scholars initially concluded that voting was extremely racially polarized.  
David Lublin’s study of House elections from 1972 to 1994 found that congressional 
elections are racially polarized.396  Lublin found that majority white districts “almost 
never” elect Black representatives.397  He also found that white support for minority 
candidates did not increase between 1972 and 1994.398  Additionally, he tested and 
rejected the hypothesis that non-racial demographic characteristics explain the level of 
polarization.399 
 Further examination led scholars to conclude that voters were considering more 
than just race.  Charles S. Bullock III analyzed fifty-two elections in the Atlanta area and 
found that Atlanta voters were less racially polarized than voters in other rural southern 
communities.400  Both Black and white candidates were able to make inroads with voters 
of the other race, though the degree of success varied greatly.401  For example, crossover 
voting increased when an incumbent, either Black or white, was on the ballot.402  
Newspaper endorsements explained much of the remaining variance in crossover voting 
rates.403  Marisa A. Abranjano, Jonathan Nagler, and R. Michael Alvarez studied voting 
in the City of Los Angeles and concluded that previous estimates of racially polarized 
voting may have been overstated.404  They looked at two elections, each of which 
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featured a Latino candidate was running against a white candidate.405  In one election, the 
Latino was the more liberal candidate; in the other, the Latino was the more conservative 
candidate.406  They found that, rather than just choosing the candidate of the same race, 
voters factored issues and ideology into their choices.407 
More recently, scholars have argued that country isn’t racially polarized.  Nolan 
McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal have argued that income inequality is 
the cause of polarization.  They show that the polarization of Congress has occurred at 
the same time that partisanship and presidential voting have become more stratified by 
income.408  Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope argued that the 
polarization of America is a myth.409  They concluded that there is “little evidence” that 
Americans have become more ideologically polarized in the last thirty years.410  Instead, 
they argue, it is “partisan elites” who have become polarized, not ordinary citizens.411 
It is important to note that there is often a different between how scholars assess 
racially polarized voting and how the Supreme Court defined it.  Scholars often seek to 
determine if race is more predictive of a voter’s choice than other factors, such as 
education or income.  Thus, even if white voters were all conservatives who voted for a 
white conservative candidate and if Blacks were all liberals who voted for a Black liberal 
candidate, scholars might say that ideology, not race was causing the polarization.  In 
Gingles, Justice William Brennan was very clear that causation was not needed to prove 
                                                          
405 Id. 
406 Id.  
407 Id. 
408 Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. Polarized America: The Dance of the Ideology 
and Unequal Riches (2008). 
409 Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized 
America (3rd. 2010). 
410 Id. 
411 Id.  
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the existence of racially polarized voting. 412    For Justice Brennan, it did not matter if 
whites and Blacks voted for a candidate of their respective race for ideological reasons, 
all that mattered was that they voted differently.413  As Bernard Grofman pointed out 
shortly after the Gingles decision, some expert witnesses failed to note the difference.414 
 
5.7 Basics of the Ecological Inference Problem 
 To determine whether there is racially polarized voting to support a Section 2 
claim, the rates of crossover voting need to be determined.  This is no simple matter.  To 
do so precisely, one would need to know how every individual voter cast her ballot.  This 
is impossible to know in the United States, because every state uses the secret ballot.  
Additionally, survey data cannot be used, because respondents often misstate or lie about 
whether they voted and for whom they voted.415   
 All is not lost though because we know who turns out to vote and we know the 
elections results.  Voter registration and turnout data are public information.  From this, 
one can see how many of the voters are members of the minority group.  Additionally, 
election results are known not only at jurisdiction-wide level, but also for individual 
voting precincts.  Jurisdictions can have hundred and even thousands of precincts (the 
                                                          
412 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
413 Id. 
414 Bernard Grofman, Multivariate Methods and the Analysis of Racially Polarized Voting: Pitfalls in the 
Use of Social Science by the Courts, Social Science Quarterly 72(4): 826-833 (1991). 
415 See, e.g., Jonathan N. Katz and Gabriel Katz, Correcting for Survey Misreports Using Auxiliary 
Information with an Application to Estimating Turnout, American Journal of Political Science 54(3): 815-
835 (2008); see also Stephen Ansolabehere and Eitan Hersh, Validation: What Big Data Reveal About 
Survey Misreporting and the Real Electorate, Political Analysis 20: 437-59 (2012). For a suggestion on how 
to combine survey data ecological data into a hybrid model, see D. James Greiner and Kevin M. Quinn, Exit 
Polling and Racial Block Voting: Combining Individual-Level and R x C Ecological Data, The Annals of 
Applied Statistics 4(4): 1774 – 1796 (2010). 
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City of Los Angeles has over 1300 precincts).   With this data, one group the precincts by 
the percentage of voters in the precinct who are minorities and then look for patterns.  Do 
precincts with a high percentage of minorities tend to support one candidate (a candidate 
of choice)?  Do precincts with a low percentage of minorities tend to oppose that 
candidate?  Answering yes to both questions would seem to imply that voting is racially 
polarized, but this may not be the case. 
 Such a simple, superficial analysis of voting data can lead to flawed conclusions.  
For example, it may be the case that there is no minority candidate of choice.  Rather, it 
may be the case that whites in minority areas vote differently than those in areas with few 
minorities.  If may be the case that in minority areas, voters of all ethnicities support one 
candidate, say the more liberal candidate.  Likewise voters of all ethnicities in areas with 
few minorities may support a different candidate, say the conservative.   Here, one could 
wrongly conclude that voting is racially polarized when it is not due to aggregation bias.  
Alternatively, it may be the case that no pattern can be discerned from this grouping 
method.  Some precincts with large minority populations may overwhelmingly support 
one candidate but others may not.  Without a clear pattern, one would have to conclude 
that voting is not racially polarized.   Because of this potential for inaccurate inferences, a 
more sophisticated method of analysis is necessary.   
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the legal requirements for redistricting under Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act.  I began by explaining the constitutional requirement to 
redraw district lines every decade to ensure equal population.  I then discussed how 
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Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act protected majority-minority districts.  The Gingles 3-
prong test for a Section 2 claim was explained and the concept of racially polarized 
voting was introduced.  Finally, I suggested why estimating racially polarized vote 
requires complex mathematical methods. 
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Chapter 6 
 
The Ecological Inference Problem and Methods 
 
 
6.1 Overview 
In this chapter, I will discuss the ecological inference problem and common 
methods for estimating racially polarized voting.  First, I will explain how the estimating 
rates of crossover voting poses an ecological inference problem.  Then, I will discuss 
commonly used methods to estimate racially polarized voting: homogenous precinct 
analysis, Goodman’s Ecological Regression, double regression, King’s Ecological 
Inference, and the multinomial-Dirichlet model.   
 
6.2 Introduction 
To understand why estimating racially polarized voting is so challenging, one 
needs to understand the information and methods that are available.  Recall from Chapter 
5 that in order to determine whether there is racially polarized voting to support a Section 
2 claim, the rates of crossover voting need to be determined.  Because the United States 
uses the secret ballot, there is no way to know how individuals voted.  Fortunately, 
though, voter registration and turnout data are public information.  From this, one can see 
how many of the voters are members of the minority group.  Additionally, election results 
are released not only at jurisdiction-wide level, but also for individual voting precincts.  
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Jurisdictions can have hundred and even thousands of precincts (the City of Los Angeles 
has over 1300 precincts).   Having this precinct-level data allows for the use of statistical 
methods to estimate how voters cast their ballot.   
As discussed in Chapter 5, statistical methods are needed because simple, 
superficial analysis of voting data can lead to flawed conclusions.  For example, it may 
be the case that there is no minority candidate of choice.  Rather, it may be the case that 
whites in minority areas vote differently than those in areas with few minorities.  If may 
be the case that in minority areas, voters of all ethnicities support one candidate, say the 
more liberal candidate.  Likewise voters of all ethnicities in areas with few minorities 
may support a different candidate, say the conservative.   Here, one could wrongly 
conclude that voting is racially polarized when it is not due to aggregation bias.  
Alternatively, it may be the case that no pattern can be discerned from this grouping 
method.  Some precincts with large minority populations may overwhelmingly support 
one candidate but others may not.  Without a clear pattern, one would have to conclude 
that voting is not racially polarized.   Because of this potential for inaccurate inferences, a 
more sophisticated method of analysis is necessary.  
The statistical methods discussed in this chapter vary not only in their methods, 
but also in the type of results they produce.  Some of these methods, Homogenous 
Precinct Analysis and Goodman’s Regression, produce only a single jurisdiction-wide 
estimate of crossover voting.  Other, more sophisticated methods, King’s Ecological 
Inference and the Multinomial-Dirichlet model, produce a jurisdiction-wide estimate and 
also provide estimates of crossover voting rates in each individual precinct.    
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6.3 The Ecological Inference Problem 
 Because voting in the United States is conducted using the secret ballot, it is 
impossible to know which voter cast which ballot.  All that is known is how many votes 
each candidate received and the demographics of the voting population.  Fortunately, 
researchers not only have this information for the county as a whole, but also for each 
individual precinct.  Consider an example depicted in Table 6.1.  Here, “C+D” is the 
number of people that turned out to vote.  “A” is the number of votes that were cast for 
the minority candidate of choice and “B” is the number of votes that were cast for the 
other candidate.416,417  There were “C” number of voters who were white and “D” number 
of people who were minorities.  Of course, researchers are not able to see how an 
individual voter cast his ballot and, thus, do not know the values in the interior cells of 
the table.   
One can improve this information, though, by converting the numbers into 
percentages, as shown in Table 6.2.  X percent of voters were minorities and it follows 
that (1-X) percent of votes were white.  One also knows that the minority candidate of 
choice received P percent of the votes and the white candidate received (1-P) percent of 
the vote.  Additionally, instead of expressing the interior cells as raw numbers, convert 
them into percentages.  Here, the percentage of white voters who supported the minority 
candidate is βW.  Therefore, the percentage of white voters who supported the white 
                                                          
416 Methods exist to estimate more than two ethnic groups.  Here, I have collapsed all non-Latinos into 
one group for two reasons.  First, it allows me to compare my results with those of other authors.  
Second, it is a practice adopted by many expert witnesses and lower courts.  Interestingly, this two-
ethnicity method was incorporated into the definition of racially polarized voting used in the California 
Voting Rights Act (Greiner, 2011). 
417 Throughout this paper, the terms Latino and Hispanic will be used interchangeably. 
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candidate is (1-βW).  Similarly, the percentage of minority voters who supported the 
minority candidate is βL, and the percentage of minority voters who supported the white 
candidate is (1-βL).   
The information in Table 6.2 can be used to place bounds on the possible values 
of βW and βL.  Note that, by simple algebra,  βL(X) + βW(1-X) = P.  Since X and P are 
known values, this is a linear equation with two unknowns that can be rewritten as βL = 
[P - βW(1-X)] / X.  Additionally, because they are percentages, 1 ≥ βL ≥ 0 and 1 ≥ βW ≥ 0.  
These bounds can be calculated for all precincts and plotted.  As example of such a 
bounds plot is shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
6.4 Homogenous Precinct Analysis 
Using these bounds calculations, one can conduct a simple analysis of racially 
polarized voting, known as “homogenous precinct analysis.”418  In this method, one uses 
only the bounds information from the most homogenous precincts.419  For example, one 
might use only precincts in which at least 90% or at most 10% of the residents are 
minorities.420  After calculating the bounds for each of these homogenous precincts, one 
can plot all of the βW precinct bounds.421  Using this plot, one then looks for a single (or 
range of) βW that crosses all of the bounds.422  This is then repeated for the βL bounds.423   
                                                          
418 J. Morgan Kousser, Ecological Inference from Goodman to King, Historical Methods. 34: 100-204 
(2001). 
419 Id. 
420 Id. 
421 Id. 
422 Id. 
423 Id. 
91 
 
 
There are many common criticisms of this method.  First, it relies on the 
assumption that there is no aggregation bias.424  This means that a white voter who lives 
in heavily minority precinct voter the same as a white voter in a precinct with few 
minorities.  Second, this method often fails to produce informative estimates.425  
Sometimes, the bounds of individual precincts are so narrow that no βW or βL exist that 
are within all of the bounds.  Other times, the bounds are so wide that the possible values 
of βW or βL are any number between zero and one.426  Third, there is no way to measure 
uncertainty.427  Because this method is so flawed and leading redistricting experts have 
recommended abandoning it, homogenous precinct analysis will not be used in the 
analysis below. 
 
6.5 Goodman’s Ecological Regression 
The most commonly used method for tackling the ecological inference problem is 
Goodman’s Ecological Regression (ER).  This method assumes that βW and βL are the 
same across precincts and that there is no aggregation bias.  Recall, from above, that 
P=βL(X) + βW(1-X).  Let the subscript i denote the value for an individual precinct.  Thus, 
using precinct level data on P and X, one can estimate βW and βL by running a linear 
regression on the equation Pi=βL(Xi) + βW(1-Xi) + e, where e is an error term.   
                                                          
424 D. James Greiner, Ecological Inference in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where Are We Now, And Where 
Do We Want to Be? Jurimetrics Journal 47: 115-167 (2007). 
425 Id. 
426 Id. 
427 Jon Wakefield, Ecological Inference for 2 x 2 Tables, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A 
164: 385-445 (2004). 
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Although this method is very popular, it is a “blunt instrument” with many 
problems.428  First, because it does not use the information on the bounds of βW and βL, it 
can produce estimates that are below zero or exceed one.429  This is most likely to occur 
when one must project the regression line beyond values for which one has data.430  
Although some authors simply round these estimates to zero or one, others argue that 
impossible estimates signal that the model does not fit the data.431,432  Second, the model 
does not produce estimates for individual level precincts.433  Thus, it is not possible to tell 
if RPV exists in some precincts, but not others.434   Third, this method weights all 
precincts equally.435  Thus, very small precincts have no less effect on the estimates than 
very large precincts.   Finally, this method fails to produce estimates for tables larger than 
2 x 2.436   
Despite these problems, ER has remained popular, especially with judges.  Many 
courts have relied on ER estimates in their decisions.  Recent, prominent examples 
include the Supreme Court case League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry,437 
the 5th Circuit Court case Rodriguez v. Bexar County,438 and the 9th Circuit Court case 
                                                          
428 Daron R. Shaw, Estimating Racially Polarized Voting: A View From the States, Political Research 
Quarterly 50(1):49-74 (1997). 
429 D. James Greiner, Ecological Inference in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where Are We Now, And Where 
Do We Want to Be, Jurimetrics Journal. 47: 115-167 (2007). 
430 J. Morgan Kousser, Ecological Inference from Goodman to King, Historical Methods 34: 100-204 (2001). 
431 D. James Greiner, Ecological Inference in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where Are We Now, And Where 
Do We Want to Be, Jurimetrics Journal. 47: 115-167 (2007). 
432 Even when impossible estimates occur, regression fits are still often “wonderful.” Christopher H. Achen 
and W. Phillips Shively, Cross-level Inference (1995). 
433 J. Morgan Kousser, Ecological Inference from Goodman to King, Historical Methods 34: 100-204 (2001). 
434 The assumption that the βs are constant can be relaxed, but doing so allows one to obtain only point 
estimates, not variances. See D. James Greiner, Ecological Inference in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where 
Are We Now, And Where Do We Want to Be? Jurimetrics Journal 47: 115-167 (2007). 
435 J. Morgan Kousser, Ecological Inference from Goodman to King, Historical Methods 34: 100-204 (2001). 
436 Gary King, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem (1997). 
437 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
438 385 F. 3d 953 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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United States v. Blaine County.439,440  Courts, though, have disagreed over the validity of 
estimates that exceed the logical bounds.  Some courts have placed less weight on such 
estimates (e.g., Aldasoro v. Kennerson441), while many others have accepted impossible 
estimates as evidence of extreme polarization (e.g., Shirt v. Hazeltine442).443  
 
6.6 Double Regression 
To overcome ER’s failure to produce estimates for 2 x 3 contingency tables, many 
authors turned to double regression.  The method was first presented by historian Morgan 
Kousser444 and popularized by Loewen,445 Kleppner,446 and Grofman et. al..447  It was 
widely used in courts by expert witnesses in voting rights cases.448  
Double Regression drops ER’s assumption that each racial group turns out in 
equal proportion.449  To implement this, the procedure runs two separate Goodman’s 
regressions, giving the method its name.  In the first regression, one runs a least squares 
regression of the fraction of the voting-age population turning out on the proportion of 
                                                          
439 363 F. 3d 897 (9th Cir. 2004). 
440 D. James Greiner. ”Ecological Inference in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where Are We Now, And Where 
Do We Want to Be?” Jurimetrics Journal. 47: 115-167 (2007). 
441 Aldasoro v. Kennerson, 922 F. Supp. 339 (S.D. Cal. 1995). 
442 Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D. 2004). 
443 D. James Greiner, Ecological Inference in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where Are We Now, And Where 
Do We Want to Be, Jurimetrics Journal 47: 115-167 (2007). 
444 J. Morgan Kousser. “Ecological Regression and the Analysis of Past Politics.” Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 4(2): 237-262 (1973). 
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446 Paul Kleppner. 1985. Chicago Divided: The Making of a Black Mayor. De Kalb: Northern Illinois 
University Press. 
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the population that is Black and white.  In the second regression, the fraction of those in 
the voting-age population who voted for a particular candidate is regressed on the 
percentage of the population that is Black and white.  The ratio of the estimates produced 
by the two estimates yields the fraction of Black and white voters who supported each 
candidate. 
Although double regression eliminates ER’s assumption of equal turnout rates for 
Blacks and whites, double regression is vulnerable to the other criticisms of ER.450  
Double regression also adds one new problem: there is no method for calculating the 
uncertainty of the estimates it produces.  Zax has shown that double regression estimators 
are neither unbiased nor consistent and has argues that the method “should be 
abandoned.”451  
 
6.7 King’s Ecological Inference 
To prevent the problem of what to do with impossible estimates, Gary King 
developed a new method, King’s Ecological Inference (EI), that incorporates the bounds 
into the estimation procedure.452  His method combines the information that on the 
variation between precincts with the precinct-level bounds on βW and βL.  EI assumes that 
βW and βL are drawn from a truncated bivariate normal distribution (TBND), which forms 
the likelihood function.  This distribution is determined by five parameters that must be 
approximated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation, using numerical integration, and then 
                                                          
450 Gary King, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem (1997). 
451 Jeffery S. Zax, The Statistical Properties and Empirical Performance of Double Regression, Political 
Analysis 131:57-76 (2005). 
452 Gary King, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem (1997). 
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simulations.  After estimating the TBND parameters, one can take random draws from it.  
More specifically, for each bounds line, one can randomly draw estimates from the slice 
above the line.  To better visualize this, in Figure 6.2, there is an example of a bounds 
plot overlaid with contour lines that identify the portion of the bounds lines that are most 
likely to contain the true estimates. 
After these samples are drawn for a specific precinct, one then computes the 
average of the βW’s and βL’s for that precinct, all of which are points along that precinct’s 
bounds line.  These averages of βW and βL are the estimates for that precinct.  Once this 
has been done for all precincts, one can then compute a weighted average of the estimates 
of βW across all of the precincts by weighting by the number of white voters in each 
precinct.  Similarly, one weights the average of βL by the number of minority voters in 
each precinct.453 
This method overcomes several of ER’s problems.  First, because EI draws 
estimates only from the part of the distribution over the bounds line, it will always 
produce estimates that are within the bounds.  Second, the precincts are properly 
weighted by population.  Third, EI produces estimates for each individual precinct and 
does not assume that voters in every precincts vote the same.  Fourth, it produces 
uncertainty estimates for not only the overall estimates of βW and βL, but also each 
individual precinct.454  
Although EI quickly became popular and used by many researchers, it has had 
several vocal critics.  In a series of articles, Wendy K. Tam Cho has strongly challenged 
                                                          
453 See Gary King, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem (1997); J. Morgan Kousser, Ecological 
Inference from Goodman to King, Historical Methods 34: 100-204 (2001); Adam Glynn and Jon Wakefield, 
Ecological Inference in the Social Sciences, Statistical Methodology. 7(3): 307-322 (2010). 
454 J. Morgan Kousser, Ecological Inference from Goodman to King, Historical Methods 34: 100-204 (2001). 
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EI’s assumptions.455  She argues that aggregation bias is a common phenomenon in 
ecological data, making King’s EI “often inappropriate.”456   Additionally, Herron and 
Shotts argued that the assumptions required for the first stage of King’s EI are 
inconsistent with the assumptions of the methods second stage.457  In Adolph, King, 
Herron and Shotts, the authors reached a consensus on how to properly run second-stage 
ecological regressions; they recommended using King’s extended EI model. 458   
The courts have had a mixed reaction to EI.  In Mallory v. Ohio459, EI was 
recognized as providing better estimates than ER.460  However, in United States v. City of 
Euclid, the court said that EI should not replace ER or even homogenous precinct 
analysis. 461,462   
 
6.8 The Multinomial-Dirichlet Model 
 Rosen, Jiang, King, and Tanner proposed a multinomial-Dirichlet model and two 
methods of estimation.463 The first method is a frequentist estimation method is based on 
                                                          
455 See Wendy K. Tam Cho., Iff the Assumption Fits…: A Comment on the King Ecological Inference 
Solution, Political Analysis 7:143-63; Luc Anselin and Wendy K. Tam Cho. “Spatial Effects and Ecological 
Inference.” Political Analysis 10:276-97 (1998); Wendy K. Tam Cho and Brian J. Gaines. “The Limits of 
Ecological Inference: The Case of Split-Ticket Voting.” American Journal of Political Science 48(1):152-71. 
456 Wendy K. Tam Cho, Iff the Assumption Fits…: A Comment on the King Ecological Inference Solution, 
Political Analysis 7:143-63 (1998). 
457 Michael C. Herron and Kenneth W. Shotts. Logical Inconsistency in King’s EI-Based Second-Stage 
Regressions, American Journal of Political Science 48:172-83 (2004). 
458 Christopher Adolph, Gary King, Michael C. Herron and Kenneth W. Shotts, A Consensus on Second-
Stage Analyses in Ecological Inference Models, Political Analysis 11(1):86-94 (2003). 
459 Mallory v. Ohio, 38 F. Supp. 2d 525 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
460 D. James Greiner, Ecological Inference in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where Are We Now, And Where 
Do We Want to Be? Jurimetrics Journal 47: 115-167 (2007). 
461 United States v. City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp.2d 584 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 
462 D. James Greiner, Re-Solidifying Racial Bloc Voting: Empirics and Legal Doctrine in the Melting Pot, Ind. 
L. J. 86(2): 447-497 (2011). 
463 Ori Rosen, Wenxin Jiang, Gary King, and Martin A. Tanner, Bayesian and Frequentist Inference for 
Ecological Inference: the R x C case, Statistica Neerlandica 55: 134-156 (2001). 
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a first moments estimator.  The second method of estimation is a Bayesian approach that 
uses Markov chain Monte Carlo methods.   A benefit of this multinomial-Dirichlet 
method is that it is better at estimating cases when there are more than two ethnic groups 
or more than two candidates.  The most common use is a 2x3 case where there are 2 
ethnic groups but three options for voters (vote for the minority candidate of choice, vote 
for the other candidate, or abstain).  This hierarchical model assumes that turnout follows 
a binomial distribution.  On the second level of the model, βL is sampled from a beta 
distribution, the parameters of which follow an exponential distribution. 
 For several years after this model was proposed, it was considered to 
computationally difficult to estimate.  Consequentially, the Rosen et al. model was not 
widely used.  Advancements in computing technology in recent years has made this much 
more feasible to estimate.  Because the model is so new, the courts have had few 
opportunities to consider it. 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
I have explained how estimating rates of crossover voting poses an ecological 
inference problem.  Then, I discussed three commonly used methods to estimate racially 
polarized voting: homogenous precinct analysis, Goodman’s Ecological Regression, 
double regression, King’s Ecological Inference, and the Multinomial-Dirichlet Model.  I 
have highlighted benefits and problems of each method and the extent to which courts 
have accepted them. 
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6.10 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 6.1:  The Basic Ecological Inference Problem 
  
Latino 
Candidate 
Non-Latino 
Candidate 
  
Non-Latino voters ? ? C 
Latino voters ? ? D 
  A B 
A+B = 
C+D 
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Table 6.2:  The Basic Ecological Inference Problem in Percentages 
  
Latino 
Candidate 
Non-Latino 
Candidate 
  
Non-Latino voters βW 1-βW 1-X 
Latino voters βL 1-βL X 
  P 1-P 1 
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Figure 6.1:  Bounds Plot 
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Figure 6.2: Bounds Plot with MLE Contour Lines 
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Chapter 7 
 
Improving Estimates of Racially Polarized 
Voting in a Multi-election Context 
 
 
7.1 Overview 
In this chapter, I propose a method to estimate racially polarized voting across elections.  
This method improves upon existing methods that estimate elections separately and then 
rely on experts to interpret the results across elections.  Instead, I suggest adding an 
additional step that considers election-specific factors that may have influenced how 
voters cast their ballot.  
 
7.2 Introduction 
The methods discussed in Chapter 6 estimate RPV in a single election, but courts want to 
see a consistent history of RPV before they will find that a Section 2 violation of the 
Voting Rights Act has occurred.  This means that RPV must be found in multiple 
elections over the recent past.  This, though, begs the obvious question of how many 
elections a researcher should estimate.  Looking at just one—or even a few—election is 
frowned upon because of the possibility that the election in question is an outlier.    
Some experts attempt to appease the courts by selecting several elections to study.  
For example, they might choose the subset of elections where one of the candidates is a 
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minority or choose elections for a single office.  Allowing the expert consultants to 
choose the elections still allows the possibility of biased estimates due to consultants 
having the ability to choose only elections most likely to be favorable to their client’s 
preferred outcome, i.e., they might cherry-pick the data.  Cherry-picking is especially 
dangerous in Section 2 legislation, where the data is being analyzed by consultants paid 
by the plaintiffs or defendants.  These consultants clearly have a conflict of interest when 
picking which elections to include in their reports to the courts.   
To overcome this selection bias, some suggest estimating RPV in every election 
that has occurred in the jurisdiction over the period in question.  This method eliminates 
the possibility of biased estimates due to sample selection, but raises a new problem.  
How does one interpret such a large number of estimates?  With a very large sample, it is 
highly unlikely that all of the elections (or none of the elections) will generate estimates 
consistent with RPV.  What should be done when some elections suggest RPV but others 
do not?   
Below, I suggest a method that can facilitate looking at RPV across multiple 
elections.  I will expand on the Rosen et al. multinomial-Dirichlet (eiMD) method by 
combining estimates of RPV across elections.  Using these combined estimates, 
researchers can answer several questions.  What is the baseline level of support from 
whites for the minority candidate of choice?  Does the race of the candidate affect 
support from minorities and white voters?   Does the quality of the candidate matter?   
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7.3 Data Collection 
 For this method, all of the data used in eiMD and more will be needed.  As in 
eiMD, precinct-level election returns are needed.  Collect data only on elections where 
the jurisdiction of the election is larger than the jurisdiction in question.  For example, if 
estimating RPV for a city council district, do not include city council elections.  
Similarly, for a Congressional district, do not use Congressional districts.  These election 
returns need to be paired with precinct-level estimates of the ethnic composition of the 
district.  As noted above, estimates of the citizen voting age population (CVAP) are 
preferred over general population estimates, voting age population estimates, or surname-
based estimates.   This is all the information one needs to conduct for eiMD.  Next, one 
needs to collect election-specific information for each and every election to be estimated.  
The aggregate election outcome and the ethnicity of the candidates should be recorded 
for each election.  Additionally, determine whether any of the candidates were 
incumbents. 
 Several manipulations of this data are needed.  First, using the ethnicity data, 
simply the data into two ethnicities—the minority group in question and everyone else.  
Second, calculate the number of voters in each precinct who abstained from voting in 
each election.  This can be calculated using the total population numbers from the CVAP 
data and the election returns.  Subtract the number of votes cast in the election in question 
for a given precinct from the CVAP estimate for the precinct.  This is the number of 
abstentions. 
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7.4 Measuring Candidate Quality  
 Many methods exist for measuring candidate quality.  Some methods measure 
quality as simply a binary variable indicating previous elective office.  In 1983, Jacobson 
and Kernell indicated whether a House candidate had previously held office with a 
dummy variable.464  Additional examples include Abramowitz (1988) and Jacobson 
(1989).465  Other authors have used ordinal scales.  In 1985, Bond, Convington, and 
Fleisher rated a challenger’s quality using both a three-point scale of experience.466  
Krasno and Green considered not only prior elective experience, but also personal 
characteristics.467  In 1989, Squire used a two-step method that first rated previous 
positions held along a seven point hierarchical scale and second multiplied the rating by 
the percentage of the state’s population represented by the previous position.468  In 1994, 
Lublin broke down Squire’s 7-point scale into six dummy variables: Senator, Governor, 
U.S. Representative, Lesser Statewide Official, State Legislator, and Local Official.469  In 
addition to previously holding elective office, campaign expenditures have also been used 
as a measure of candidate quality.470 
                                                          
464 Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections (1983). 
465 See Alan I Abramowitz, Explaining Senate Election Outcomes, American Poltical Science Review 
82(June):385-403 (1988). See also Gary C. Jacobson, Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House 
Elections 1946-86,  American Political Science Review 83:773-93 (1989). 
466 Jon R. Bond, Cary Covington, and Richard Fleisher, Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional 
Elections, Journal of Politics 47:510-29 (1985). 
467 Jonathan S. Krasno and Donald Philip Green, Preempting Quality Challengers in House Elections, 
Journal of Politics 50:920-36 (1988). 
468 Peverill Squire, Challengers in U.S. Senate Elections, Legislative Studies Quarterly 14:531-47 (1989). 
469 David Ian Lublin, Quality, not Quantity: Strategic Politicans in U.S. Senate Elections, 1952-1990, Journal 
of Politics 56(1): 228-41 (1994). 
470 Jon R. Bond, Cary Covington, and Richard Fleisher, Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional 
Elections, Journal of Politics 47:510-29 (1985). 
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Unlike these previous studies, I am studying only a small subset of precincts in a 
large jurisdiction.  In those studies, the jurisdiction being analyzed was the entire 
jurisdiction voting for the office in question.  Here, the jurisdictions being analyzed, 
precincts, are small subsets of the entire jurisdiction.  Because precincts are such small 
subsets of the jurisdictions I am looking at and voting results vary so greatly from 
precinct to precinct, I can use how well the candidate of choice did in the election to 
measure the quality of that candidate.   
 
7.5 Procedure 
 First, using the precinct-specific election returns and the precinct-level estimates 
of ethnicity, obtain eiMD estimates of racially polarized voting.  Run the estimation using 
a 2xC framework.  As noted above, voters will be broken into two ethnic breakdowns—
the minority group in question and everyone else.   C is the number of candidates in the 
election plus one (for abstention).   After obtaining these estimates, identify which 
candidate was most preferred by the minority group in question, i.e., identify which 
candidate won the plurality of minority votes.  For further estimation purposes, this will 
be the candidate of choice.   
 Next, create a new data set where each election is one observation.  In the 
columns of the data set, input the estimates from the first step.  Specifically, one column 
is the estimate of the percentage of minority voters who voted for the candidate of choice.  
Another column is the estimate of the percentage of non-minorities who voted for the 
candidate of choice.  Create a dummy variable to identify whether the candidate of choice 
is a member of the minority group, e.g., if considering Hispanics voters, input a 1 if the 
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candidate herself Hispanic and a 0 if she is not.  Then, create another variable to identify 
which candidate was an incumbent.  If the candidate of choice was an incumbent, insert a 
-1.  If the other candidate was an incumbent, insert a 1.  If neither candidate was an 
incumbent, insert a 0.  
How to measure candidate quality depends on whether the candidate of choice 
won or lost the election.  If the candidate of choice won the election, then use her margin 
of victory over the second place finisher.  For example, if the candidate of choice 
received 52% of the vote and the 2nd place finisher received 41% of the vote, then input 
.11 in the data set. If the candidate of choice lost, calculate the margin of victory of the 
winner over the candidate of choice and then multiply that by negative one.  For example, 
if the candidate of choice received 35% of the vote and the winner received 47% of the 
vote, then input -.12 in the data set.    
With this new data set, run two ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.  First, 
regress the percent of minorities voting for the minority candidate of choice (yi
m) on the 
candidate quality variable (Qi), the ethnicity of the candidate of choice variable (Ei), and 
incumbency variable (Ii).  Include an intercept, xi.  Thus, the equation to estimate is    
yi
m = ai +  αQi +  μEi + δIi +  𝜀𝑖. 
Then, run a second OLS regression.  This time regress the percentage of non-minorities 
voting for the minority candidate of choice (yi
nm) on the candidate quality variable (Qi), 
the ethnicity of the candidate of choice variable (Ei), and incumbency variable (Ii).   
Again include an intercept, xi.  Thus, the second equation to estimate with OLS is    
yi
NM = bi +  βQi +  ηEi + ρIi +  𝜀𝑖. 
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7.6 Results and Inferences  
Several interesting questions can be answered from these regressions.  Are minority 
voters more likely to vote for a candidate if she is also a minority?  If μ is positive and 
statistically significant, then yes.  Does incumbency affect how minorities vote?  Yes, if 
δ is statistically significant.  Does minority support for the candidate of choice drop if the 
candidate is of low quality?  Yes, if  α  is positive and significant. 
 Similar questions can be asked about how non-minorities vote.  Are non-
minorities less likely to vote for the minority candidate of choice if the candidate is also a 
minority?  Yes if  η is negative and significant.  If β is positive and significant, then non-
minorities are more likely to support high quality candidates of choice. The effect of 
incumbency on how non-minorities vote is measured through ρ. The intercept, bi, can be 
interpreted as the baseline level of support for a candidate of choice who is of the same 
quality as her opponent, is not a minority, and is neither an incumbent nor running 
against an incumbent. 
If the results show that non-minorities have a low baseline of support for minority 
candidates, do not provide more support for high quality minority candidates, and 
decrease their support when the candidate of choice is a minority, these would all be 
indications of racially polarized voting by non-minorities.  If the data demonstrate none 
of these criteria, then this would indicate that non-minorities are not voting as a block 
against minority candidates.  In Chapter 8, I will apply this method to a real data set from 
Los Angeles County and interpret the results.   
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7.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I proposed a method to estimate RPV across multiple elections.  
This improves upon the current method of estimating individual elections and relying on 
expert inferences to make a broad interpretation.  There are two stages to the method.  
First, estimate racially polarized voting in each election using the Rosen et al. 
multinomial-Dirichlet (eiMD) method.  Second, regress those results on several election-
specific variables, specifically incumbency, candidate quality, and candidate ethnicity.   
With these results, one can identify whether voting is racially polarized across multiple 
elections, instead of estimating a single election. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Estimating Racially Polarized Voting in a Multi-
election Context: Los Angeles 
 
 
8.1 Overview 
I apply the method proposed in Chapter 4 to data from Los Angeles County.  I 
look at Supervisorial District 3, where voting has previously been shown to be racially 
polarized.  Examining 10 elections, I find that a multi-election analysis shows that voting 
is not racially polarized. 
 
8.2 Introduction 
In this chapter, I demonstrate how to proceed with the method that I proposed in 
Chapter 4.  Recall from above, that this method allows researchers to estimate racially 
polarized voting across multiple elections.  Additionally, it enables researchers to 
consider such election specific factors as incumbency, candidate quality, and candidate 
ethnicity. Below, I apply this method to the 3rd Supervisorial District of Los Angeles 
County.  This is an important jurisdiction to study because other scholars have previously 
found that voting in District 3 was racially polarized.  Additionally, the Supervisorial 
districts have previously been the subject of successful Section 2 litigation and contention 
continued to be present during the most recent redistricting cycle. 
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Using my multi-election method of analysis, I find that voting in the district is not 
racially polarized.  My results suggest that non-Hispanic voters care a lot more about 
candidate quality than any other factor, including ethnicity.  Hispanics, however, still care 
a great deal about candidate ethnicity and are far more likely to vote for a candidate who 
is Hispanic. 471 
 
8.3 The History of Racially Polarized Voting in Los Angeles 
During the past twenty-five years, the County of Los Angeles has repeatedly been 
accused of violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  In Garza v. County of Los 
Angeles, the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) sued 
the County of Los Angeles.472  MALDEF argued that the county supervisorial lines were 
drawn in a manner that discriminated against Hispanics.  Specifically, the lines cracked 
Hispanic voters so that they could not form a majority in any of the districts.  The Court 
sided with MALDEF and found the county to be in violation of the Voting Rights Act.473  
Just over a decade later, MALDEF filed another lawsuit alleging a similar Voting Rights 
Act violation.  In Cano v. Davis, MALDEF argued that the newly-drawn Congressional 
districts would abridge the rights of Hispanics by diluting their voting strength.474  This 
time, though, MALDEF lost and the Congressional districts remained the same.475 
Although there have been no recent lawsuits, scholars have continued to study 
racially polarized voting in Los Angeles and voting rights advocates have continued to 
                                                          
471 Throughout this paper, the terms Latino and Hispanic will be used interchangeably. 
472 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990). 
473 J. Morgan Kousser, How to Determine Intent: Lessons from L.A., Journal of Law & Politics 7: 591-732 
(1991). 
474 211 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (C.D. Cal 2002). 
475 Id. 
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criticize redistricting in the county.  Absoch, Barreto, and Woods analyzed fifteen 
elections occurring between 1994 and 2003.476  They were particularly interested in 
estimating RPV in Supervisorial District 3, which seemed ripe for a Section 2 claim. 
From their post-Garza data, Absoch, Barreto, and Woods concluded that there was 
overwhelming evidence that voting in Supervisorial District 3 was racially polarized.477  
During the recent redistricting cycle, voting rights advocates again pushed for dramatic 
changes in the district line.  Mark Rosenbaum, the chief counsel for the American Civil 
Liberties Union in Los Angeles, said that passing a plan with minimum changes (as was 
ultimately done) “will repeat one of the most shameful chapters in Los Angeles County 
history.”478  
 
8.4 Data 
This ongoing contention about whether the supervisorial districts in Los Angeles 
County violate the Voting Rights Act makes Los Angeles an excellent jurisdiction to 
apply the method I introduced in Chapter 4. I use data that was made publicly available 
by the County of Los Angeles during public hearings on the most recent redistricting of 
the supervisorial districts.  The data contain election returns by precinct and estimates of 
ethnicity for the citizen voting age population (CVAP).479  I obtained election from the 
                                                          
476 Yishaiua Abosch, Matt Barreto, and Nathan Woods, “An Assessment of Racially Polarized Voting For 
and Against Latino Candidates in California.” In Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006, ed. Ana 
Henderson (2007). 
477 Id. 
478 Mark Rosenbaum, Drawing Fair District Lines, The Los Angeles Times (Sept. 27, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/27/opinion/la-oe-rosenbaum-county-supervisors-redistricting-
20110927. 
479 The individual units of the data are not actually precincts—they are “redistricting units.”  A redistricting 
unit is larger than a precinct but smaller than a census tract.  For consistency with the literature, I use the 
term precinct when discussing the data. 
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Secretary of State and the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk.  
Incumbency information was obtained from news reports. 
Using the data released by Los Angeles County is preferable for several reasons.  
First, it conforms to standard practice—it is the data other experts use when analyzing 
racially polarized voting in Los Angeles County.  For example, the above referenced 
study by Absoch, Barreto, and Woods used the data released by Los Angeles County 
during the previous redistricting cycle.480  Second, because it has the census data already 
matched to the voting data, it saves a substantial amount of time.  Third, it contains 
identifying information on which supervisorial district a given precinct is in, which 
enables me to easily look at an individual supervisorial district.    
The main drawback to using the data released by Los Angeles County is that the 
election returns are limited.  Many elections are not included in the data set.  One may 
suspect that Los Angeles is only releasing data for elections where voting is not racially 
polarized, but this does not appear to be the case.  Other researchers have found the 
publicly released data to be sufficient to prove claims of racially polarized voting.   
I have restricted the analysis below to Supervisorial District 3 for two reasons. 
First, Absoch, Barreto, and Woods found that voting in Supervisorial District 3 was 
racially polarized using the data from the previous redistricting cycle.481  Thus, there is 
good reason to suspect that voting in the district may have been racially polarized in the 
years covered by the more recent data.   
                                                          
480 Yishaiua Abosch, Matt Barreto, and Nathan Woods, “An Assessment of Racially Polarized Voting For 
and Against Latino Candidates in California.” In Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006, ed. Ana 
Henderson (2007). 
481 Id. 
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Second, because my method requires elections to be held by a larger jurisdiction 
than the one in question, using a smaller district gives me the freedom to estimate more 
elections.  If I suspected that voting throughout Los Angeles County were racially 
polarized, then it would be flawed to use county returns to measure candidate quality.   
Poor performance by a Hispanic candidate would not be an indication of low quality, but 
rather an obvious effect of county-wide racial polarization.  I do not suspect this though, 
because Hispanics have been elected to countywide office.  In one of the elections that I 
include in my analysis below, a Hispanic candidate was elected Los Angeles County 
Assessor.  The City of Los Angeles elected a Hispanic Democratic mayor, Antonio 
Villaraigosa, over a white Democratic opponent, James Hahn.  The election was a 
landslide, with Villaraigosa receiving 59% of the vote to Hahn’s 41%.  Additionally, 
statewide Hispanic candidates have also performed very well in Los Angeles County.  I 
think it is highly unlikely that a court would find that voting in all of Los Angeles County 
is racially polarized. 
The boundaries of District 3 during the years included in my data can be seen in 
Figure 8.1.  The district is on the western edge of Los Angeles County and includes the 
beaches of Malibu.  It runs southwest to Santa Monica and heads inland past Beverly 
Hills to Glendale.  From there, it heads north to the San Fernando Valley and then back 
east to Malibu.  Since 1994, the district has been represented by Zev Yaroslavsky. 
I use data from ten elections, as shown in Table 8.1.   Five of these elections are 
statewide and five are countywide.  All of the statewide races come from the 2006 
Democratic primary.  In four of the elections, a Latino/a candidate was on the ballot in a 
race with no incumbent.  In the first election, Lieutenant Governor Cruz Bustamante, the 
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Latino candidate, ran against political novice John Kraft for Insurance Commissioner.  
The statewide and Los Angeles County election results can be seen in Table 8.3.  
Bustamante won the election with 70.5% of the overall vote to Kraft’s 29.5%.  In Los 
Angeles County, Bustamante won 72.9% of the vote to Kraft’s 27.1%.  In the second 
election, Latino City Attorney of Los Angeles Rocky Delgadillo ran against Oakland 
Mayor Jerry Brown for Attorney General.  Delgadillo lost the election, receiving only 
36.7% of the statewide vote to Brown’s 63.3%.  In Los Angeles, Delgadillo received 
47.4% of the vote and Brown earned 52.6% of the vote.  In the third election, Latina State 
Senator Deborah Ortiz ran against State Senator Debra Bowen for Secretary of State.  
Ortiz gained 39.1% of the statewide vote to Bowen’s 60.9%.  The Los Angeles total was 
38.5% for Ortiz and 61.5% for Bowen.  In the fourth election, Latina State Senator Liz 
Figueroa ran against State Senator Jackie Speier and then-Insurance Commissioner John 
Garamendi for Lieutenant Governor.  In this 3-man election, Figueroa finished a distant 
third, gaining only 17.7% of the vote to Garamendi’s 42.6% and Speier’s 39.7%.  In Los 
Angeles County, Figueroa did much better, receiving 21.8% of the vote.  Garamendi won 
53.6% and Speier won 24.6%.   In the final statewide election, no Latino/a was on the 
ballot.  Board of Equalization Chair John Chiang defeated State Senator Joe Dunn with 
53.3% of the vote to Dunn’s 46.7% of the vote.  In Los Angeles, the results were almost 
identical with Chiang receiving 53.2% of the vote to Dunn’s 46.8%. 
In the five countywide elections, two of the elections featured Hispanic 
candidates.  In the 2002 primary, Lee Baca easily won reelection with 72.3% of the vote 
in a 3-candidate field.  In the 2006 primary, Baca again won reelection this time with 
66.8% of the vote in a 5-candidate field.  In that same election, the County Assessor, Rick 
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Auerbach, was reelected with 77.5% of the vote.  In the 2008 primary, District Attorney 
Steve Cooley was reelected with 64.9% of the vote in a 3-candidate field.  His nearest 
opponent was Albert Robles, a Latino, who earned only 19.6% of the vote.  In the final 
race, another Latino, John Noguez defeated John Wong, 59.6% to 40.4%. 
 
8.5 Multinomial-Dirichlet Estimation 
The first step in implementing the method discussed in Chapter 4 is to estimate 
racially polarized voting using the Rosen et al. multinomial-Dirichlet (eiMD) method.  I 
did that for each of the ten elections and the results appear in Table 8.2.  In the elections 
where more than two candidates were running, I looked at the eiMD results and identified 
the candidate receiving the plurality of the Hispanic vote.  That candidate is the one 
whose name appears in Table 8.2 under the column “Candidate of Choice.”  
 In both of his campaigns for reelection as sheriff, Lee Baca was the candidate of 
choice.   In his 2002 reelection, he received 56.6% of the Hispanic vote and 79.2% of the 
non-Hispanic vote.  In his 2006 reelection, he earned 52% of the Hispanic vote and 
76.5% of the non-Hispanic vote.  In that same election, Auerbach was reelected as 
Assessor with 62% of the Hispanic vote and 85.6% of the Non-Hispanic vote. Of the 10 
elections analyzed, Auerbach and Baca’s are the only ones in which the candidate of 
choice received more support from non-Hispanics than from Hispanics. 
 The two Hispanics running for countywide office had very different levels of 
support from non-Hispanics.  In the race for District Attorney, Robles won 54.1%  of the 
Hispanic vote but only 16% of the non-Hispanic vote.  In the 2010 race for Assessor, 
Noguez received 73% of the Hispanic vote and nearly 52% of the non-Hispanic vote. 
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 Looking at the statewide races, Bustamante did very well with Hispanic and non-
Hispanic voters alike.  He received 85.6% of the Hispanic vote and 69.2% of the non-
Hispanic vote.  Likewise, Dunn received similar levels of support from both groups.  
53.6% of Hispanics supported him and 43.7% of non-Hispanics. 
 Delgadillo, Figueroa, and Ortiz all did much better with Hispanic voters than they 
did with non-Hispanic voters.  Delgadillo received 90.1% of the Hispanic vote, but only 
24.1% of the non-Hispanic vote.  Similarly, Ortiz received 81.8% of the Hispanic vote, 
but only 20.1% of the non-Hispanic vote.  Although a majority of Hispanics supported 
Figueroa (61.2%), a dismal 5.6% of non-Hispanics voted for her. 
 Traditionally, this would be the end of the data analysis.  Experts would need to 
infer from this data whether voting is racially polarized.  As you can see, the evidence is 
mixed.  Some Hispanic candidates, Bustamante and Noguez, received a majority of the 
non-Hispanic vote.  Other candidates, such as Figueroa and Robles, faired very poorly 
with non-Hispanic voters.  With mixed results such as these, what is a researcher to 
conclude?  The method I proposed in Chapter 4 is designed to clear up just such a murky 
situation. 
 
8.6 Estimation in a Multi-Election Context 
Recall from Chapter 4 that I am going to estimate two ordinary least squares 
regressions.  The first is 
yi
m = ai +  αQi +  μEi + δIi +  𝜀𝑖, 
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where yi
m  is the percentage of minorities voting for the candidate of choice, Qi is the 
candidate quality variable, Ei is a dummy for whether the candidate of choice is a 
minority, and Ii is an incumbency variable.  I have also included an intercept, ai.   
The second regression,  
yi
NM = bi +  βQi +  ηEi + ρIi +  𝜀𝑖, 
is very similar but here yi
nm is the percentage of non-minorities voting for the minority 
candidate of choice. 
 The first step in undertaking the method I have proposed is to create another data 
set.  See Table 8.3.  Recall from Chapter 4 that how to measure candidate quality depends 
on whether the candidate of choice won or lost the election.  If the candidate of choice 
won the election, then use her margin of victory over the second place finisher.  For 
example, for Bustamante who won the election and received 70.5% of the vote and who’s 
challenger received 29.5% of the vote, subtract 0.295 from 0.705 and input .41 in the data 
set. If the candidate of choice lost, calculate the margin of victory of the winner over the 
candidate of choice and then multiply that by negative one.  For example, Delgadillo lost 
with 36.7% of the vote to Brown’s 63.3% of the vote, so subtract 0.633 from 0.367 and 
input - 0.266 in the data set.  These values are Qi. 
 Whether the candidate of choice is Hispanic can also be seen in Table 8.3  None 
of the opponents of the candidates of choice were incumbents, so the incumbency 
variable functions as a dummy indicating whether the candidate of choice was an 
incumbent. 
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 With this data, I first ran the OLS regression of Hispanic support for the candidate 
of choice.  The results can be seen in Table 8.4.  The coefficient on the quality variable 
was .1668, but the standard error was .1144.  The coefficient on incumbent was -.1243 
with a standard error of .0829.  This implies that candidate quality and incumbency are 
not important to Hispanics when deciding whom to support.  The coefficient on ethnicity 
was .1938 with a standard error of .0829.  Thus, ethnicity is the most important factor for 
Hispanics when deciding for whom to vote.  Hispanics give substantially more support to 
their preferred candidate when she is Hispanic. 
 Next I ran the OLS regression of non-Hispanic support for the candidate of 
choice.  These results can be seen in Table 8.5.  The coefficient on ethnicity was -.0566 
with a standard error of .0787 and the coefficient on incumbency was .0311 with a 
standard error of .0668.  Thus, the ethnicity of the candidate of choice and incumbency 
are not driving how non-Hispanics vote.  The coefficient on candidate quality was .6498 
with a standard error of only .0726.  This is large and highly significant.  Thus, non-
Hispanic voters in District 3 vote very similarly to voters outside the district. 
 The intercepts may be thought of as the baseline level of support for a candidate 
of choice who is not Hispanic and when there is no incumbent in the race.  The baseline 
level for Hispanic voters is 59% and the baseline for non-Hispanics is 43%.   
 
8.7 Results 
 Using the method I proposed in Chapter 4, I have found two important results.  
First, the baseline level of support from non-Hispanics is relatively high at 43%.  Second, 
that level does not significantly drop if the candidate is Hispanic.  Although ethnicity 
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plays a large role in how Hispanics vote, it was not a significant factor in non-Hispanics 
vote choices.  Second, candidate quality is important to non-Hispanics, but less important 
to Hispanics.  These results suggest that the criteria needed to demonstrate racially 
polarized voting is not present.  Hispanics do vote as a block to support their candidate of 
choice, especially when the candidate is Hispanic.  However, non-Hispanics are not 
blindly voting against candidates of choice.  Instead, their votes mirror those of voters 
outside of the district and are based on candidate quality.  Thus, non-Hispanics are not 
voting as a racial block to defeat Hispanic candidates.  
 
8.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated how to proceed with the method that I 
proposed in Chapter 4.  This method allows researchers to estimate racially polarized 
voting across multiple elections.  It also enables the researcher to consider election 
specific factors, such as incumbency, candidate quality, and candidate ethnicity.   
Applying this method to Los Angeles County, I found that Supervisorial District 3 is not 
racially polarized.  This is important because other scholars have previously found that 
voting in District 3 was racially polarized.  My results suggest that non-Hispanic voters 
care a lot more about candidate quality than any other factor.  Additionally, they suggest 
that Hispanics still care a great deal about candidate ethnicity.
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8.9 Tables and Figures 
Table 8.1:  List of Candidates and Election Results 
*denotes incumbent 
 
 
Office Election Candidate 
Los Angeles 
Results
Statewide 
Results
Lee Baca* 72.3
Primary 2002 John Stites 15.3
Patrick Gomez 12.4
Bustamante 72.9 70.5
Kraft 27.1 29.5
Delgadillo 47.4 36.7
Brown 52.6 63.3
Ortiz 38.5 39.1
Bowen 61.5 60.9
Figueroa 21.8 17.7
Primary 2006 Speier 24.6 39.7
Garamendi 53.6 42.6
Joe Dunn 46.8 46.7
John Chiang 53.2 53.3
Lee Baca* 66.8
Don Meredith 10.1
Ken Masse 10.0
Ray Leyva 8.6
Paul Jernigan 4.5
Rick Auerbach* 77.5
John Taxes Loew 22.6
Steve Cooley* 64.9
Primary 2008 Albert Robles 19.6
Steve Ipsen 15.5
John Noguez 59.6
John Wong 40.4
Assessor Primary 2006
Sheriff
District 
Attorney
Assessor General 2010
Primary 2006
Primary 2006
Primary 2006
Primary 2006
Primary 2006
Insurance 
Commissioner
Attorney 
General
Secretary         
of State
Lieutenant 
Governor
Controller
Sheriff
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Table 8.2:  Estimates of Racially Polarized Voting using eiMD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sheriff Primary 2002 Baca 0.566 0.792
Insurance Commissioner Primary 2006 Bustamante 0.856 0.692
Controller Primary 2006 Dunn 0.536 0.437
Attorney General Primary 2006 Delgadillo 0.901 0.241
Lieutenant Governor Primary 2006 Figueroa 0.612 0.056
Secretary of State Primary 2006 Ortiz 0.818 0.201
Assessor Primary 2006 Auerbach 0.620 0.856
Sheriff Primary 2006 Baca 0.520 0.765
District Attorney Primary 2008 Robles 0.541 0.160
Assessor General 2010 Noguez 0.730 0.518
Hispanic 
Vote
Non-Hispanic 
VoteOffice Election
Candidate of 
Choice
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Table 8.3:  Variables for OLS Estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sheriff P 2002 Baca 72.3% 15.3% 57.0% 1
Ins Comm P 2006 Bustamante 70.5% 29.5% 41.0% 1
Controller P 2006 Dunn 46.7% 53.3% -6.6%
Attorney Gen P 2006 Delgadillo 36.7% 63.3% -26.6% 1
LT Gov P 2006 Figueroa 17.7% 42.6% -24.9% 1
Sec of State P 2006 Ortiz 39.1% 60.9% -21.8% 1
Assessor P 2006 Auerbach 77.5% 22.6% 54.9% 1
Sheriff P 2006 Baca 66.8% 10.1% 56.7% 1
District Attorney P 2008 Robles 19.6% 64.9% -45.3% 1 1
Assessor G 2010 Noguez 59.6% 40.4% 19.2% 1
Margin of 
Victory IncumbentHispanicOffice Election
Candidate of 
Choice
CoC Vote 
Share
Winner/Runner 
up Vote Share
124 
 
 
Table 8.4:  Results of OLS Regression for Hispanic Voters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient Standard Error
Intercept .5861 .0901
Candidate 
Quality
.1668 .1144
Ethnicity of 
CoC
.1938 .0978
Incumbant -.1243 .0829
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Table 8.5:  Results of OLS Regression for non-Hispanic Voters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient Standard Error
Intercept .4260 .0726
Candidate 
Quality
.6498 .0922
Ethnicity of 
CoC
-.0566 .0787
Incumbant .0311 .0668
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Figure 8.1:  Supervisorial District 3  
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Chapter 9 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
In this work, I analyzed the history of the Voting Rights Act, the Court’s decision 
in Shelby County v. Holder, and proposed a legislative package to respond to the Court’s 
decision.  First, I discussed the legislative and judicial history of the Voting Rights 
Act.  Then, I explained the last challenge to the Voting Rights Act, NAMUDNO v. 
Holder, and Shelby v. Holder.  I explained that the decision to overturn Section 4 and 
only Section 4 was predictable.  I then analyzed proposals for Congressional action and 
put forth my own proposal.  I recommend abandoning efforts to amend Section 4.  
Instead, I proposed focusing on passing a package that amends Section 3 and creates a 
competitive grant program to encourage states to voluntarily improve their election 
procedures to protect voting rights.  I argued that this “carrot and stick” package could 
gain necessary Republican support and pass Congress during the lame-duck session. 
Then, I discussed why estimates of racially polarized voting are needed from a 
legal standpoint and why they are difficult to estimate mathematically.  I explained the 
constitutional requirement to reapportion Congressional districts and the Supreme Court 
cases that lead to the equal population requirement.   I discussed the Voting Rights Act, 
looking closely at Section 2.  I then looked at the Supreme Court’s three-prong test for 
determining when majority-minority districts should be drawn and introduced the concept 
of racially polarized voting. 
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From there, I discussed the general ecological inference problem and the most 
commonly used methods of estimating racially polarized voting.  I explained why 
estimating rates of crossover voting is an ecological inference problem.  Then, I 
discussed homogenous precinct analysis, Goodman’s Ecological Regression, double 
regression, King’s Ecological Inference, and the multinomial-Dirichlet model.     
I proposed a 2-step method to estimate racially polarized voting in a multi-
election context.  In the first step, I obtained election-specific estimates of racially 
polarized voting using the Rosen, Jiang, King, and Tanner (2001) multinomial-Dirichlet 
model.  In the second step, I regressed these election results on candidate quality, 
incumbency, and ethnicity of the minority candidate of choice.  This method allowed me 
to estimate the baseline level of support for candidates of choice and test whether the 
ethnicity of the candidates affected how voters cast their ballots. 
 I applied this method to the 3rd Supervisorial District of Los Angeles County.  
Despite previous findings by other scholars of racially polarized voting in the district, I 
did not find evidence to support such a conclusion.  Although I found that Hispanic 
voters are united and vote as a bloc for their candidates of choice, I found that non-
Hispanics are not unified against the Hispanic candidate of choice.  Instead, I found that 
candidate quality is the driving force in how non-Hispanics vote.  Additionally, I found a 
high level of baseline support from non-Hispanics for the Hispanic candidate of choice. 
  Looking forward, the Court’s decision in Shelby has increased the importance of 
statistics in litigation.  Data will be “more valuable and more likely to be more influential 
than ever before.”482  Although the “interaction between the law and social science 
                                                          
482 Doug Chapin, Voting Rights After Shelby County: Bring on the Election Geeks, Election Law Journal 12: 
327 (2014). 
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professions has advanced considerable in recent years,” there is “room in the legal 
profession for a better understanding of what social science evidence does and does not 
show.”483  This is a trend that is not going to go away.  Statistical methods are only going 
to improve and expand their reach into new areas of litigation.  While it’s understandable 
that today’s judges, who were educated decades ago, were not prepared by their law 
school education to critically evaluate statistical evidence, it is unacceptable that law 
schools are continuing to produce future judges and justices that are equally ill-equipped.  
Law schools have a duty to adequately prepare the future members of the third branch of 
government.  Failing to train the next generation of judges to understand basic statistics is 
unacceptable and dangerous.   
Just as law schools require courses in Constitutional law and legal writing, law 
schools should also require that all students take one semester of a quantitative methods 
class.  While an introductory statistics course would be ideal, it need not be required.  I 
recognize that law school students would protest a mandatory statistics class.  Instead, the 
curriculum could allow students to choose a quantitative class that most suits their 
interests.  Some students would hopefully choose statistics, but others could choose a 
legal finance class, an e-discovery class, or even an accounting class.  Any course with a 
quantitative methods component would be a vast improvement over the current legal 
education.   
  
                                                          
483 David C. Kimball, Judges are not Social Scientists (Yet), Election Law Journal 12:237 (2014). 
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